China is both competitor and necessary partner. We reject the false choice between Cold War confrontation and naive accommodation.
We're a policy platform with 50 researched positions on every major issue. This page breaks down our approach to US-China relations — but there's much more to explore.
The answer is both — and that's what makes China policy harder than either party wants to admit. China is simultaneously the United States' largest strategic competitor and an indispensable partner on the existential challenges of the 21st century. Any serious policy must hold both realities at once.
The competition is real. China is engaged in the largest military buildup since the Cold War, with a $292 billion defense budget — the second largest in the world — funding rapid expansion in naval power, hypersonic missiles, space capabilities, and nuclear weapons. China's 400+ nuclear warheads are projected to exceed 1,000 by 2030. In technology, China pursues dominance in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G infrastructure, and biotechnology through a combination of state investment, forced technology transfers, and industrial-scale intellectual property theft that costs the US an estimated $200-$600 billion annually.
The partnership is also real. Climate change cannot be solved without China, which produces 30% of global CO2 emissions. Pandemic preparedness requires Chinese cooperation on surveillance and response. Nuclear arms control is meaningless without engaging China's growing arsenal. Global financial stability depends on coordination between the world's two largest economies. These are not optional challenges — they are existential, and none of them can be addressed through confrontation alone.
The false binary is dangerous. Hawks who want a new Cold War ignore that China is embedded in every global supply chain, holds $770 billion in US debt, and is the world's largest trading nation. You cannot "contain" an economy this interconnected the way the US contained the Soviet Union. Doves who counsel engagement without consequences ignore that China under Xi Jinping has militarized the South China Sea, crushed democracy in Hong Kong, committed atrocities against Uyghur Muslims, and made clear its intention to absorb Taiwan — by force if necessary.
The Common Good approach rejects the false choice. We compete where we must, cooperate where we must, and maintain the strategic discipline to tell the difference. That's not weakness — it's the only approach that has ever worked with a rival power this consequential. Read more about our defense and national security framework.
Not every concern about China is equally serious. Conflating real threats with inflated ones leads to bad policy, wasted resources, and dangerous miscalculation. Here's what actually threatens American interests — and what doesn't.
What is not a proportionate threat: the idea that China will imminently overtake the US economically (China faces severe demographic decline, a real estate crisis, and slowing growth), that every Chinese student or researcher is a spy, or that ordinary trade with China inherently undermines American security. Threat inflation is itself a danger — it distorts resource allocation, fuels racism against Asian Americans, and makes diplomatic solutions harder to achieve. See our racial justice page on combating anti-Asian hate.
The Common Good approach to China is built on a simple principle: compete where we must, cooperate where we must, and invest in American strength rather than relying on punitive measures that hurt Americans as much as they hurt China.
This plan is built on six pillars, each addressing a specific dimension of the US-China relationship. Together, they create a strategy that protects American interests, supports American workers, strengthens alliances, and avoids the catastrophic miscalculation that both current approaches risk.
For the complete China strategy with sourcing and implementation details, see the full US-China relations issue page.
The US-China trade relationship is the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world. Understanding how it actually works — who buys what, who benefits, and who gets hurt — is essential to evaluating any policy proposal.
| Metric | Value | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Total bilateral trade | $575 billion/year | Largest bilateral trade relationship |
| US imports from China | $427 billion | Electronics, machinery, furniture, apparel |
| US exports to China | $148 billion | Agriculture, aircraft, semiconductors, energy |
| Trade deficit | $279 billion | Grew after 2018 tariffs |
| China-held US debt | $770 billion | 2nd largest foreign holder |
| Tariff cost to US households | $1,200-$2,000/year | Functions as regressive consumer tax |
| US jobs dependent on China trade | ~900,000 export jobs | Agriculture sector most exposed |
| Rare earth dependency | 90% of global processing | Critical for defense, EVs, electronics |
The data tells a clear story: tariffs have not reduced the trade deficit, have not brought manufacturing jobs back, and have not changed China's behavior. What they have done is raise prices for American consumers and farmers, who lost billions in agricultural exports when China retaliated. The cost of tariffs is paid by American importers — and passed on to American consumers. This isn't disputed by any serious economist.
Sources: US Census Bureau, Peterson Institute for International Economics, USDA. See the full trade policy page for detailed sourcing.
Taiwan is the single most dangerous flashpoint in US-China relations — and potentially the most consequential geopolitical crisis of the 21st century. How the US handles it will determine whether great-power competition remains competitive or becomes catastrophic.
The history matters. The US "one-China policy" — established in 1979 when the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing — acknowledges that China claims Taiwan but does not endorse that claim. The Taiwan Relations Act commits the US to providing Taiwan with defensive weapons and maintaining the capacity to resist any use of force that would jeopardize Taiwan's security. This framework of "strategic ambiguity" — where the US does not explicitly commit to defending Taiwan but strongly implies it — has kept the peace for over four decades.
Why Taiwan matters strategically. Taiwan produces over 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors through TSMC. These chips are in every phone, computer, car, weapon system, and AI server on Earth. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan would give Beijing control over the single most critical input in the modern economy — a chokepoint more powerful than OPEC's control of oil in the 1970s. Beyond semiconductors, Taiwan is a 23-million-person democracy. Allowing its forcible absorption would set a precedent that military conquest of democratic neighbors is tolerable — a precedent with implications far beyond the Taiwan Strait.
Deterrence through strength and alliances. The Common Good approach maintains strategic ambiguity — which has worked for 45 years — while strengthening the deterrence framework that makes invasion prohibitively risky for China. This means deepening the alliance network (Japan, Australia, the Philippines), continuing arms sales to Taiwan focused on asymmetric defense (anti-ship missiles, mines, mobile air defense), investing in US naval and air capabilities in the Western Pacific, and accelerating semiconductor diversification so a conflict doesn't crash the global economy.
What it does not mean is abandoning ambiguity with reckless declarations of support that could embolden Taiwanese independence advocates or provoke Chinese hardliners. The goal is to make conflict unthinkable — not to dare it into existence. For more on the alliance framework, see the defense and national security page.
China policy in the United States is distorted by myths from both ends of the political spectrum — threat inflation from hawks and wishful thinking from doves. Effective policy requires cutting through both.
Myth: "China will collapse under its own contradictions."
Reality: Predictions of China's imminent collapse have been made for 30 years, and they have been wrong every time. China faces real structural challenges — demographic decline, a real estate crisis, youth unemployment, and political rigidity — but the Chinese Communist Party has proven remarkably adaptive at managing internal crises. Policy premised on collapse is wishful thinking, not strategy. The US must plan for a China that remains powerful, not one that conveniently implodes.
Myth: "China will take over the world."
Reality: China is a formidable competitor, not an unstoppable juggernaut. Its economy is roughly 65% the size of the US economy in nominal terms. Its military, while growing rapidly, lacks the global force projection capabilities of the US. Its population is aging and declining — China lost 850,000 people in 2022 alone. Its one-party system struggles with innovation and has no mechanism for political self-correction. The US retains enormous advantages in technology, alliances, immigration, higher education, and financial markets that are not going away.
Myth: "Tariffs fix the trade deficit."
Reality: The US trade deficit with China was $346 billion before the 2018 tariffs. After four years of escalating tariffs, it hit $382 billion in 2022. Tariffs don't fix trade deficits because trade deficits are driven by macroeconomic fundamentals — specifically, the gap between what a country saves and what it invests. Tariffs on China simply redirect imports to Vietnam, Mexico, and other countries while raising prices for American consumers. They are a tax, not a strategy. See the trade policy page for the full analysis.
Myth: "We should decouple entirely from China."
Reality: Full decoupling would cost the US economy an estimated $1.6 trillion according to the US Chamber of Commerce. China is embedded in virtually every global supply chain. American farmers depend on Chinese markets. American manufacturers depend on Chinese components. American consumers depend on Chinese goods to keep prices affordable. Strategic de-risking — reducing dependence on China for critical goods while maintaining trade in non-strategic sectors — is rational. Full decoupling is economic self-harm dressed up as toughness.
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China policy is too important for partisan posturing. Read the full plan — with sources, data, and a strategy that protects American interests without stumbling into unnecessary conflict.