Russia's invasion is an illegal war of aggression. A sovereign nation's right to self-determination is not negotiable.
We're a policy platform with 50 researched positions on every major issue. This page breaks down our position on Ukraine, NATO, and the defense of democratic sovereignty — but there's much more to explore.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was an illegal war of aggression — the most serious violation of international law and the UN Charter that one state can commit against another. Understanding why it happened requires distinguishing between Russia's stated justifications and its actual motivations.
The NATO expansion debate. Russia has long argued that NATO's eastward expansion after the Cold War threatened its security and violated alleged promises made during German reunification. While NATO did expand — adding Poland, the Baltic states, and others — no binding commitment against expansion was ever made in any treaty, and every nation that joined NATO did so voluntarily, precisely because of fears about Russian aggression. The argument that NATO expansion "provoked" Russia treats sovereign nations as pawns rather than actors with their own agency and their own security concerns. Ukraine's desire to move toward the West was driven by Ukrainians, not imposed by NATO.
Putin's imperial ambitions. In a lengthy essay published in July 2021 — months before the invasion — President Putin argued that Ukrainians and Russians are "one people" and that Ukraine's independence was a historical aberration. This was not a security argument; it was a denial of Ukrainian nationhood. The invasion followed a pattern of Russian military intervention to reassert control over former Soviet states: Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and the eastern Donbas from 2014 onward. The common thread is not NATO expansion — it is Russia's refusal to accept the sovereignty of its neighbors.
The 2014 turning point. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 — the first forcible annexation of European territory since World War II — and its sponsorship of separatist forces in eastern Ukraine were precursors to the 2022 invasion. The Minsk agreements, brokered to end the fighting in the Donbas, were never fully implemented by either side. Russia used the period between 2014 and 2022 to build up military forces along Ukraine's borders while testing Western resolve — which proved inconsistent.
The full-scale invasion. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a multi-axis invasion of Ukraine, including an attempt to capture Kyiv and overthrow the government. The invasion has resulted in tens of thousands of military and civilian casualties on both sides, the displacement of over six million Ukrainian refugees, massive destruction of civilian infrastructure, and documented war crimes including the targeting of hospitals, schools, and residential areas. It is the largest land war in Europe since 1945.
The war in Ukraine is not a distant European problem. Its outcome will shape the international order that America built and depends on — the system of rules, norms, and alliances that has prevented great-power war for nearly 80 years.
Precedent for international order. If Russia succeeds in seizing territory by force, the principle that borders cannot be changed through military aggression — the most fundamental rule of the post-World War II order — is dead. Every authoritarian leader watching this conflict is asking the same question: can I get away with what Russia is doing? The answer to that question will be determined by the outcome in Ukraine.
China and Taiwan. Beijing is closely watching how the world responds to Russia's invasion. If the West allows Russia to succeed, it sends a clear signal that military aggression against smaller neighbors can work — a signal with direct implications for Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the broader Indo-Pacific. Supporting Ukraine is not just about Europe; it is about the global precedent that shapes China's calculations. For the CGP position on China, see the China policy page.
European stability. Europe is America's largest trading partner and home to its most important military alliances. A Russian victory in Ukraine would destabilize the entire continent — increasing refugee flows, raising energy prices, and potentially drawing NATO into a direct confrontation with Russia that would be far more costly in blood and treasure than supporting Ukraine's defense.
Nuclear nonproliferation. In 1994, Ukraine gave up the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal — inherited from the Soviet Union — in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the US, and the UK in the Budapest Memorandum. Russia has violated those guarantees completely. If the lesson of Ukraine is that giving up nuclear weapons makes you vulnerable to invasion, no country will ever give up nuclear weapons again — and many more countries will seek to acquire them. For the CGP position on nuclear policy, see the nuclear weapons page.
American values. The United States was founded on the principle that people have the right to choose their own government. Russia's invasion is a direct assault on that principle — an attempt by an authoritarian regime to extinguish a democracy by force. Americans can disagree about how much to spend and how long to sustain support, but the basic question — should democracies be allowed to be conquered by dictatorships? — has a clear answer.
The Common Good approach supports Ukraine's sovereignty and defense while managing escalation risks, strengthening the transatlantic alliance, and planning for a durable peace. It rejects both abandonment of Ukraine and direct US military combat — pursuing instead the strategy that has proven most effective: sustained support that enables Ukraine to defend itself.
The plan is guided by five principles: sovereignty is non-negotiable, aggression cannot be rewarded, alliances require equitable burden-sharing, diplomacy and defense are complementary (not contradictory), and accountability for war crimes is essential to any lasting peace.
For the full defense and foreign policy framework, see the defense and foreign policy page.
The United States has committed over $175 billion in total assistance to Ukraine since February 2022. That is a significant sum — but context matters. Compared to the cost of a wider war, the US defense budget, or what allied nations are contributing, the investment in Ukraine's defense is both strategically sound and fiscally manageable.
| Category | Amount | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Military Aid | ~$107 billion | Weapons, ammo, training, intelligence |
| Economic Support | ~$27 billion | Keeping Ukrainian government operational |
| Humanitarian Aid | ~$10 billion | Refugee support, food, medical aid |
| Total US Aid | ~$175 billion | Over roughly 2.5 years |
| Annual US Defense Budget | ~$886 billion | Ukraine aid is a fraction of annual spending |
| European Allied Contributions | ~$100 billion | Combined military, economic, humanitarian |
| Cost of Post-9/11 Wars | $8+ trillion | Iraq + Afghanistan over 20 years |
The comparison to the post-9/11 wars is instructive. The US spent over $8 trillion and lost over 7,000 service members in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Ukraine, the US is achieving a strategic objective — degrading the military capability of a primary adversary and defending the rules-based international order — at a fraction of the cost and with zero American combat casualties. Much of the military aid consists of existing equipment from US stockpiles that would eventually be replaced regardless, meaning the actual fiscal cost is lower than headline figures suggest.
The question is not whether the US can afford to support Ukraine. The question is whether the US can afford the consequences of abandoning Ukraine: a triumphant Russia, an emboldened China, a shattered alliance system, and a world in which might makes right. The cost of that world — in future military spending, lost trade, and eventual direct conflict — would dwarf anything spent on Ukraine's defense.
Sources: Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker, Congressional Research Service, Department of Defense. See the defense and foreign policy page for detailed sourcing.
NATO — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — is a defensive military alliance of 32 member nations founded in 1949 to counter the Soviet threat to Western Europe. It is the most successful military alliance in history, having kept the peace in Europe for over 75 years. But it has a burden-sharing problem that must be addressed.
Article 5: collective defense. The core of NATO is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against all. This does not mandate automatic military response — each member determines its own contribution — but it is a powerful political commitment that has deterred aggression against NATO members for over seven decades. Article 5 has been formally invoked only once: on September 12, 2001, after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, when NATO allies deployed to support the US in Afghanistan.
The 2% GDP target. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO members agreed that each country should spend at least 2% of its GDP on defense. As of 2024, only a fraction of NATO members meet this target. The United States spends approximately 3.4% of GDP on defense, while many European allies — including some of the wealthiest — spend well under 2%.
| Country | % of GDP | Meets 2% Target? |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 3.4% | Yes |
| Poland | 3.9% | Yes |
| Greece | 3.0% | Yes |
| United Kingdom | 2.3% | Yes |
| France | 2.1% | Yes |
| Germany | 2.1% | Yes |
| Canada | 1.4% | No |
| Spain | 1.3% | No |
| Belgium | 1.1% | No |
Why the US bears a disproportionate share. The United States accounts for roughly two-thirds of total NATO defense spending. This imbalance predates the Ukraine war and has been a source of legitimate frustration across US administrations of both parties. After World War II, the US subsidized European defense to contain the Soviet Union — but the Cold War ended 35 years ago, and many European allies have continued to underinvest in their own defense, relying on the American security umbrella.
How the CGP would address this. The Common Good Plan supports a binding timeline for all NATO members to meet the 2% GDP target, with annual public reporting on progress. Allies that fail to meet their commitments after a reasonable transition period should face reduced access to US military infrastructure and intelligence sharing. The goal is not to weaken the alliance but to strengthen it — by ensuring that European security is a shared responsibility, not a subsidy. A stronger Europe is in America's interest, and demanding that allies invest in their own defense is not isolationism — it is good alliance management.
NATO remains the most effective military alliance on Earth. Its deterrent value is immense — no NATO member has ever been attacked, precisely because potential aggressors know they would face the collective response of 32 nations. The Common Good Plan is committed to maintaining and strengthening this alliance, while ensuring that its burdens and benefits are equitably shared. For the broader defense policy framework, see the defense and foreign policy page.
Russian propaganda and domestic political narratives have generated persistent myths about the war in Ukraine. Here are four of the most common — and what the facts actually show.
Myth: "NATO expansion provoked Russia, so the war is the West's fault."
Reality: Every nation that joined NATO after the Cold War did so voluntarily — because they feared Russian aggression, not because NATO forced them to join. Their fears have been vindicated by Russia's invasions of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022). No binding promise against NATO expansion was ever made in any treaty. More fundamentally, the argument that NATO "provoked" Russia treats sovereign nations as buffer zones with no right to choose their own alliances — the very imperial mindset that makes Russia a threat to its neighbors. Finland and Sweden joined NATO in response to Russia's invasion, not the other way around.
Myth: "Ukraine isn't a real country — it's historically part of Russia."
Reality: Ukraine has a distinct language, culture, and national identity stretching back centuries. It declared independence in 1991 with overwhelming popular support (over 92% in a referendum) and has been recognized as a sovereign state by every country in the world — including Russia, which signed multiple treaties recognizing Ukraine's borders. Putin's claim that Ukraine is not a real nation is a revisionist narrative designed to justify imperial conquest. By this logic, any country could invade a neighbor by claiming historical ties. Ukrainian national identity has only strengthened since the invasion, as millions of Ukrainian citizens — including Russian-speaking Ukrainians — have chosen to defend their country.
Myth: "This doesn't affect Americans — it's Europe's problem."
Reality: The war has already affected Americans through higher energy and food prices, disrupted global supply chains, and the threat of nuclear escalation. More importantly, if Russia succeeds in conquering a European democracy by force, it sets a precedent that will be followed — by Russia in other countries, by China in Taiwan, and by every authoritarian regime testing the boundaries of the international order. The rules-based system that prevents great-power war is the foundation of American prosperity and security. Letting it collapse to save money in the short term would be the most expensive foreign policy mistake in American history.
Myth: "We can't afford to help Ukraine — we have problems at home."
Reality: The United States can address domestic challenges and support Ukraine — these are not mutually exclusive. Total US aid to Ukraine represents roughly 5% of the annual defense budget. Meanwhile, the US spends $886 billion per year on defense overall. The argument that America "can't afford" Ukraine is not a fiscal argument — it's a priorities argument dressed up as a budget constraint. The Common Good Plan addresses affordability, healthcare, housing, and education with specific, funded proposals — and supports Ukraine. A country with a $28 trillion GDP can do more than one thing at a time.
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The rules-based international order is the foundation of American security. Supporting Ukraine's defense is an investment in that order — and a fraction of what abandonment would cost. Read the full policy and see how the US can lead.