Section 01

Executive Summary

Four years into the full-scale invasion, Russia has lost approximately 1.2 to 1.3 million soldiers killed or wounded. Ukraine has suffered 500,000 to 600,000 military casualties and over 15,000 civilians killed. The war's outcome will shape the international order for a generation.

The Common Good Party will: continue military aid until Ukraine's sovereignty is restored; maintain full commitment to NATO and Article 5; oppose any peace deal that rewards territorial conquest; support ICC prosecution of Russian war crimes; and apply the same standard of international law to Russia, Israel, and every other actor on the world stage — ally or adversary.

NATO spending is no longer the problem it once was. For the first time since the 2% target was set in 2014, all NATO allies met or exceeded 2% of GDP in 2025, with European allies investing $574 billion — a 20% real-term increase. The platform supports the alliance's trajectory toward the 5% target agreed at the Hague Summit by 2035.

Section 02

The Problem

The scale of human cost, the trajectory of the conflict, and the stakes for the international order are all larger than most Americans realize.

Part 1

Human Cost

CategoryFigure
Russian military casualties (killed + wounded) ~1.2 to 1.3 million
Russian soldiers killed 275,000–325,000 (CSIS); 319,300–461,200 confirmed by name
Ukrainian military killed ~55,000 (official); 100,000–200,000 (Western estimates)
Ukrainian military casualties (killed + wounded) 500,000 to 600,000
Ukrainian civilians killed 15,172+
Ukrainian civilians injured 41,378+
North Korean forces casualties 6,000+ killed and wounded
Russia's monthly losses vs. recruitment40,000 casualties/month against 35,000 recruited — net negative
Part 2

Territorial Reality

Russia currently controls approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory — including Crimea, most of Luhansk and Donetsk, and portions of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian advances in 2025 averaged 70 meters per day near Pokrovsk — at extraordinary human cost. At current pace, Russia would need an additional two years to capture the rest of Donetsk province alone.

In February 2026, for the first time since 2023, Ukraine achieved a net territorial gain — aided in part by restricted Russian access to Starlink.

Civilian casualties in 2025 were 31% higher than 2024, driven by sustained Russian attacks on energy infrastructure — deliberately targeting heating and electricity for civilian populations during winter. This is not incidental damage. It is a documented war crime strategy.

Section 03

How We Got Here — US Aid & the Trump Retreat

US support for Ukraine has been the decisive variable — and the Trump administration's 44-fold reduction of that support represents the most consequential shift in American foreign policy since the Iraq War.

Part 1

US Aid Breakdown

CategoryAmount
Total allocated (FY 2022–2024) $183.6 billion
Security assistance (71% of total) ~$130.7 billion
FY 2025 aid $3.92 billion
FY 2026 aid (as of Feb 2026) $220 million — a 44-fold reduction from peak
Remaining available for obligation $7.14 billion
Remaining Presidential Drawdown Authority$5.5 billion
Part 2

The Trump Peace Plan — Why It Is Unacceptable

The Trump administration proposed a 28-point plan (later condensed to 19 points) with key terms including: Ukraine cedes Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as "de facto Russian"; Kherson and Zaporizhzhia frozen along the line of contact; Ukraine never joins NATO; Ukraine caps its military size; full amnesty for all parties; and $100 billion in frozen Russian assets invested in reconstruction with the US receiving 50% of profits.

This plan is unacceptable for four reasons:

• It rewards aggression — giving Russia everything it invaded Ukraine to obtain, establishing the precedent that territorial conquest works
• It sets a catastrophic precedent for Taiwan, the Baltic states, and every small nation bordering an aggressive major power
• The amnesty clause covers documented war crimes: the Bucha massacre, forced deportation of Ukrainian children, and systematic torture of prisoners of war
• Ukraine itself — whose sovereignty is the subject of the negotiation — has rejected it. A peace deal imposed over the objection of the country being invaded is not peace

Section 04

NATO Burden-Sharing — The Problem Is Solved

The 'free-rider' critique of NATO allies has been the dominant Republican argument for reducing US commitment. That argument is no longer accurate. For the first time since the 2% target was set in 2014, all NATO allies met or exceeded it in 2025.

MetricFigure
Total NATO defense spending (2025) ~$1.6 trillion
US share ~$980 billion (62%)
European + Canada share ~$574 billion
European spending increase (2025 vs. 2024) +20% real terms
European spending increase since 2014 +106% (more than doubled)
Germany defense spending (2025) $107 billion — 4th largest globally
Countries exceeding 3.5% GDP Poland, Lithuania, Latvia
New NATO target (Hague Summit 2025)5% of GDP by 2035 — agreed by all members

At the start of 2025, the US provided 20% of all military equipment Ukraine was using — with 25% from Europe and 55% produced by Ukraine itself. But that 20% from the US is described by military analysts as "the most lethal and important" — particularly long-range precision strike systems, air defense, and intelligence integration that European suppliers cannot yet match.

Section 05

Our Policy — Four Pillars

The Common Good Party's Ukraine and NATO policy is built on four pillars: support Ukraine until sovereignty is restored, maintain NATO, ensure accountability for war crimes, and apply international law consistently.

Pillar 1

Support Ukraine Until Sovereignty Is Restored

Continue military aid — lethal weapons, ammunition, air defense systems, intelligence, and training — for as long as Ukraine needs it to defend its internationally recognized territory.

No peace deal that rewards aggression. Crimea is Ukrainian. The Donbas is Ukrainian. Any negotiated outcome must be based on restoration of Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, or at minimum be freely agreed to by Ukraine without coercion — not dictated by the aggressor or imposed by a third party.

Aid conditioned on accountability: Ukraine must demonstrate responsible use of military equipment, continued anti-corruption reform, and democratic governance. Accountability is not punishment; it is what makes sustained support politically viable.

Oppose the Trump peace plan in its current form. Ceding territory, granting amnesty for war crimes, barring NATO membership, and capping Ukraine's military are not peace terms — they are surrender terms.

Pillar 2

Maintain NATO — Full Commitment

Full commitment to Article 5. The collective defense guarantee is non-negotiable. NATO membership means something, and that meaning cannot depend on the political preferences of any single administration.

The 2% floor is now met. Continue supporting the trajectory toward the Hague Summit 5% target by 2035. The US should encourage — not berate — allies who have already doubled their spending.

Keep the US in NATO. The alliance provides forward deterrence, intelligence-sharing, interoperability, and burden-sharing that would cost far more to replicate bilaterally. Withdrawing or undermining NATO is a strategic gift to Russia and China.

Support NATO's open-door policy. Ukraine, when it meets the criteria, should be eligible for NATO membership. The decision belongs to NATO and Ukraine — not to Russia.

Pillar 3

Accountability for Russian War Crimes

Support the ICC investigation into Russian war crimes — including Bucha, the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, and systematic torture of prisoners of war.

No amnesty in any peace deal. Documented war crimes must be prosecuted. The international legal order requires it, and accepting amnesty as a peace condition would destroy the ICC's credibility for a generation.

Maintain and strengthen sanctions on Russia until a just peace is achieved. Sanctions target the oligarch class and defense-industrial base, not ordinary Russian citizens.

Frozen Russian assets (~$300 billion) held in Western institutions should be used for Ukrainian reconstruction — through a multilateral legal framework, not as a profit-sharing venture for the US government.

Pillar 4

Consistent Application of International Law

The platform's approach to Ukraine is consistent with Issue 6 (Israel and Gaza): international law applies to everyone. Russia cannot invade a sovereign nation and seize territory. Israel cannot occupy Palestinian territory indefinitely. The United States cannot fund war crimes and claim moral authority.

This consistency is what gives the platform credibility. A party that demands accountability from Russia but shields Israel — or vice versa — has no foreign policy. It has preferences.

Taiwan is watching Ukraine. A successful Russian territorial conquest emboldens Beijing. Supporting Ukraine is, among other things, the most effective Taiwan deterrence policy available to the United States. The credibility of deterrence is indivisible.

Section 06

Fiscal Impact

Ukraine aid costs are modest in the context of federal spending — less than 1% of total federal spending over the period of the war. Much of the security assistance flows directly back to American defense contractors, who produce replacement equipment that is newer and more capable than what was sent to Ukraine.

ComponentFiscal ImpactNotes
Military aid continuation $10–20B/year Restores pre-2025 levels. Much flows to US defense industry for stockpile replenishment with newer equipment.
NATO commitment Existing budget No additional cost. US already meets spending targets. European allies now at 2%+ and rising.
Frozen Russian assets $300B (already held) Already frozen in Western institutions. Multilateral framework directs to reconstruction — not new appropriations.
Sanctions enforcement Existing agencies OFAC and Treasury already funded. Continued enforcement, not new spending.
Pentagon audit (Issue 9) Net savings Audit requirement ensures aid spending is accountable and efficient across all defense expenditures.

The cost of supporting Ukraine is a fraction of the cost of failing to support it. If Russia holds conquered territory, the US faces far more expensive security commitments — reinforcing NATO's eastern flank, deterring emboldened authoritarian aggression, and managing a global order where territorial conquest is a viable strategy again. The $10–20 billion per year is insurance against a much larger bill.

Section 07

Implementation Timeline

Most of this policy can be enacted immediately — restoring aid and reaffirming commitments requires executive action, not new legislation.

Phase 1Day 1 – Month 3
  • Restore military aid to pre-2025 levels
  • Reaffirm Article 5 and full NATO commitment
  • Resume full intelligence sharing with Ukraine
  • Announce opposition to amnesty provisions in any peace deal
Phase 2Months 3–12
  • Negotiate multilateral frozen Russian asset framework
  • Strengthen sanctions on oligarch class and defense industry
  • Support ICC investigation and cooperation
  • Coordinate with EU on long-term security guarantees
Phase 3Year 1–2
  • Support Ukraine's NATO membership pathway when criteria are met
  • Push for comprehensive peace negotiations on Ukrainian terms
  • Begin reconstruction program using frozen Russian assets
Phase 4Year 2+
  • Sustained support until sovereignty is restored
  • Reconstruction program fully operational
  • War crimes prosecution through ICC
  • Long-term security architecture for Eastern Europe established
Section 08

Addressing Counterarguments

"This is too expensive."

US aid to Ukraine amounts to less than 1% of total federal spending over the period of the war. Much of it flows back to American defense industry as contracts for replacement equipment. The cost of not supporting Ukraine — an emboldened Russia, a collapsed international order, far more expensive NATO reinforcement on Russia's doorstep — is orders of magnitude higher. This is one of the cheapest security investments available.

"We should focus on problems at home."

The platform does both. Thirty-five issues cover healthcare, housing, education, infrastructure, and every domestic priority. But domestic policy does not exist in a vacuum. A world where territorial conquest is viable threatens American security and economic interests directly — and costs far more to address after it happens than before.

"We need to negotiate peace."

The platform supports diplomacy aggressively — but diplomacy that produces a just outcome, not a forced surrender dressed as peace. A deal that rewards aggression is not peace. It is a pause before the next invasion. Russia's foreign minister has publicly stated there are "no deadlines" — Russia is not negotiating in good faith. The way to produce a genuine negotiation is to make continued occupation more costly, not less.

"Ukraine is corrupt."

Ukraine has corruption challenges — which is precisely why aid is conditioned on transparency, anti-corruption reform, and democratic governance. But corruption in Ukraine does not justify Russia's invasion, just as corruption in any country does not justify foreign conquest. The platform addresses governance alongside support — not as a reason to abandon a sovereign nation defending its territory.

"NATO expansion provoked Russia."

Sovereign nations choose their own alliances. Finland and Sweden joined NATO specifically because Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that neutrality provides no protection against aggression. Russia does not have a veto over its neighbors' security arrangements. The invasion of Ukraine is not a response to NATO — it is the reason NATO exists. Accepting this framing would require accepting that autocracies have the right to dictate the foreign policy choices of democracies.

Section 09

Cross-References & Policy Positions

Part 1

Cross-References

#6 Israel & Gaza Consistent application of international law. If international law applies to Russia in Ukraine, it applies to Israel in Gaza. Credibility on Ukraine depends on consistency on Gaza.
#8 China Taiwan is watching Ukraine. A successful Russian territorial conquest emboldens Beijing. Supporting Ukraine is the most effective Taiwan deterrence policy available.
#9 Defense Spending Pentagon audit requirements apply to Ukraine aid. Defense budget reform does not cut Ukraine support — a temporary strategic investment, not a permanent structural commitment.
#14Trade Policy Sanctions on Russia and coordination with European allies on economic pressure require functioning multilateral trade relationships and institutions.
#20Corporate Power Defense contractor lobbying for perpetual conflict spending is addressed through the independent government research arm and lobbying reform provisions.
#31Government CorruptionOversight of Ukraine aid spending falls under the accountability framework. Inspector general protections ensure oversight bodies function.
Part 2

Policy Position Summary

Military aid to Ukraine Continue until sovereignty restored — restore pre-2025 levels immediately
Territorial integrity Crimea and Donbas are Ukrainian — no forced cession
Peace negotiations Support diplomacy — but only outcomes Ukraine freely agrees to, not dictated terms
Trump peace plan Oppose in current form — amounts to capitulation and war crimes amnesty
War crimes amnesty Reject — support ICC prosecution of all documented war crimes
Article 5 / NATO commitment Full, unconditional — non-negotiable regardless of political pressure
NATO spending 2% floor now met; support trajectory to 5% by 2035 (Hague Summit target)
Ukraine NATO eligibility Support open-door policy — Ukraine decides; Russia has no veto
Frozen Russian assets (~$300B) Use for reconstruction via multilateral framework — not US profit-sharing
Sanctions on Russia Maintain and strengthen until just peace; target oligarchs and defense industry
Consistency with Issue 6 International law applies equally — Russia, Israel, and every other actor
"If Russia can seize territory by force and keep it, the message to every authoritarian government on earth is that the international system bends to violence. Sovereignty is not negotiable."
— The Common Good Party

Sources & Citations

  1. Al Jazeera — The Ukraine War in Numbers (February 2026): aljazeera.com
  2. Council on Foreign Relations — How Much US Aid Is Going to Ukraine: cfr.org
  3. NATO — Secretary General's Annual Report 2025 (March 2026): nato.int
  4. OHCHR — Four Years of Full-Scale Invasion: Key Facts (February 2026): reliefweb.int
  5. ABC News — Trump Administration's 28-Point Ukraine Peace Plan: abcnews.com
  6. Defense News — All NATO Allies to Meet 2% Spending Target: defensenews.com
  7. DW — European NATO Defense Spending Rose 20% in 2025: dw.com
  8. Ukraine Oversight — Remaining US Funding: ukraineoversight.gov
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