Policy Document Series · Issue 25 of 35 · April 2026
Build It Right. Build It Fast. Build It for Everyone. $4 Trillion.
America's infrastructure is failing. The ASCE gave the U.S. a C in 2025 — the highest grade in 27 years — yet nine of eighteen categories still fall in the D range. The investment gap is $3.7 trillion. Poor infrastructure costs every American household $2,700 per year. The U.S. pays 3–5 times more per mile than peer nations — not because American workers are overpaid, but because the system is structurally broken. This platform fixes it.
Contents
The American Society of Civil Engineers gave the United States a C in its 2025 Infrastructure Report Card — the highest grade in 27 years, and still a failing mark. Nine of eighteen categories remain in the D range. The total investment needed over the next decade is $9.1 trillion; planned spending covers $5.45 trillion, leaving a gap of $3.7 trillion that grew by $1.1 trillion despite the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law — because costs rose faster than funding.
The Common Good Party's position: the richest country on earth should have infrastructure worthy of the 21st century. This platform proposes a $4 trillion, 10-year investment organized around nine pillars: National High-Speed Rail, Public Transit Revolution, Clean Water, Broadband as Public Utility, Electric Grid Modernization, Aviation/Ports/Freight, Build Smart Procurement Reform, National Infrastructure Fund, and Climate-Resilient Infrastructure. Every $1 billion invested creates 13,000–25,000 jobs. The $269 billion in annual congestion costs, $121 billion in annual outage costs, and $2,700 per household in infrastructure-failure costs are the price of not acting.
The U.S. spends 0.51% of GDP on infrastructure — below France (0.88%), Germany (0.77%), Japan (1.1%), South Korea (1.32%), and China (4.8%). Infrastructure spending peaked at 2.77% of GDP in 1975 and has declined every decade since. The problem is not a lack of resources. It is a lack of political will, compounded by an institutional structure that pays 3–5 times more per mile than peer nations for equivalent projects. The Transit Costs Project confirmed in 2023 that this cost premium is almost entirely institutional — not geography, not labor, not terrain. It is fixable.
The Interstate Highway System — the greatest infrastructure investment in American history — returned $6 for every $1 invested in long-run GDP growth. $4 trillion at comparable returns produces $24 trillion in economic benefit. This is not spending. It is investment.
Infrastructure failure is not abstract. It is the hour lost to traffic, the lead in the tap water, the power out for two days after a storm, the broadband that doesn't reach the farm. Four structural failures define the crisis.
America's infrastructure crisis was not inevitable. It was the product of deliberate choices: a gas tax frozen for political convenience, agencies stripped of internal expertise, a regulatory structure designed sequentially rather than concurrently, and a reflexive turn toward privatization that consistently transferred public value to private shareholders.
1975–Present
The Investment Retreat — From 2.77% to 0.51% of GDP
Infrastructure spending peaked at 2.77% of GDP in 1975 — the year the Interstate Highway System was nearing completion. It has declined every decade since. Today the U.S. invests 0.51% of GDP in infrastructure, while China invests 4.8%, South Korea 1.32%, and Japan 1.1%. The compounding consequence is a deferred maintenance backlog measured in the trillions, a system aging past its design life, and a nation whose physical backbone is quietly failing beneath the surface.
1993
The Gas Tax Frozen — A Funding Mechanism Designed for 1993
The federal gas tax was set at 18.4 cents per gallon in 1993 and has never been raised since — losing 45% of its purchasing power to inflation. The Highway Trust Fund has run structural deficits since 2008, requiring more than $270 billion in general fund transfers. As vehicles became more fuel-efficient, the revenue base eroded further. No elected official has been willing to raise the gas tax. The result: a 21st-century infrastructure deficit financed by a mechanism frozen in the Clinton administration's first year.
1980s–Present
Hollowed Government Capacity — The Consultant Dependency Trap
Federal, state, and local transportation agencies systematically outsourced engineering and project management to private consultants beginning in the 1980s. Brookings research documents that every standard deviation increase in in-house DOT capacity produces a 16% cost decrease, while consultant dependency inflates costs 20%. Spain, Japan, South Korea, and Australia maintain large in-house engineering agencies; the U.S. gutted them. The result: agencies without internal expertise to evaluate bids, manage contractors, or catch cost overruns before they compound.
Sequential by design
The Regulatory Stack — Sequential Where It Could Be Concurrent
U.S. infrastructure projects face a sequential stack of independent regulatory obligations — NEPA environmental review (averaging 4.5 years), state environmental review, multi-agency permitting, freight railroad negotiation, right-of-way litigation, and FRA safety certification — each of which can independently kill a project. No other high-income country imposes all of these simultaneously in sequence. Every peer nation runs these reviews concurrently. Spain, France, and Japan conduct thorough environmental review and build HSR in 4–8 years. The U.S. review takes 4.5 years on average — before a shovel touches the ground.
1994–2024
Privatization Failures — Capturing Value, Delivering Less
The 2008 Chicago parking meter deal received $1.15 billion for a 75-year lease worth an estimated $11.6 billion — a $10.45 billion giveaway to private investors. The UK privatized British Rail in 1994; the result was 30 years of fragmented service, rising fares, declining safety, and a 2024 renationalization. Private water systems charge 59% more than public systems for equivalent service. The pattern is consistent: privatization of public monopoly infrastructure extracts value from the public and delivers it to shareholders while service quality declines.
Every peer nation provides the U.S. a blueprint for what is achievable. The barriers to world-class infrastructure are political and institutional — not physical or financial.
| Country / System | Performance | Cost / Efficiency | Key Lesson |
|---|---|---|---|
| JapanShinkansen HSR | 31,000+ miles; 10B passengers; zero fatalities since 1964 | 245% farebox recovery; $40–60M/mile construction | Dedicated ROW + public ownership = self-sustaining operations |
| SpainAVE High-Speed Rail | 3,700 miles; 35 operational corridors | $20.5M/mile vs. U.S. $200M+ — a 10× gap | Standardized designs + in-house ADIF engineering agency eliminates consultant bloat |
| GermanyElectric Grid | Average outage: 11.7 min/year vs. U.S. 118 min/year | 0.77% GDP infrastructure spending; 10× better reliability | Consistent grid investment produces dramatically better reliability at comparable cost |
| ViennaPublic Transit | €365/year pass (€1/day); transit mode share 39% → 43% | Car traffic fell 6% after low-fare introduction | Affordable transit drives mode shift without mandates |
| NYCCongestion Pricing | Year 1: traffic −11%; ridership +7%; pedestrian fatalities −9% | $550M+ annual revenue; 27M fewer vehicles/year | Congestion pricing delivers across every metric it has been tried |
| Hong KongMTR Transit | 161.55% farebox recovery — profitable transit system | 60%+ of capital funded by transit-adjacent development | Value capture around stations finances world-class transit without taxpayer subsidy |
| IsraelWater Reuse | 90% of wastewater recycled for agricultural use | Model for arid-region water security at scale | Federal investment + technology = water independence; directly applicable to Western U.S. |
| ChinaHSR + Grid | 31,000+ miles HSR; 97% of cities 500K+ connected; 40,000+ km HVDC grid | 4.8% GDP infrastructure spending | Pre-committed funding + concurrent permitting produces scale and speed impossible under U.S. sequential model |
The consistent lesson: countries that treat infrastructure as a long-term public investment — with pre-committed funding, in-house institutional capacity, concurrent permitting, and permanent public ownership — build faster, cheaper, and better. Spain's $20.5M/mile HSR vs. California's $200M+ is almost entirely explained by institutional structure, not geography. The Transit Costs Project (2023) confirmed this. France, Spain, Japan, and South Korea run legal challenges concurrently with construction. The U.S. is the only HSR-aspiring nation where a process deficiency can physically stop a train from being built.
The Common Good Party's infrastructure platform addresses every layer of the failure — from the physical assets to the institutional structures that determine whether they get built on time and on budget. All regulatory agencies referenced are subject to the Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard.
The American High-Speed Rail Act establishes a national HSR network — true 220 mph high-speed rail, not enhanced conventional — over 20 years. A companion HSR Fast-Track Rail Act provides the full regulatory architecture to build at world-class speed without gutting environmental protections.
Funding: $250B over 20 years from the National Infrastructure Fund and a dedicated HSR Trust Fund funded by freight rail user fees ($8–12B/yr), aviation surcharge ($2–4B/yr), and parallel freight track leasing revenue ($3–8B/yr at maturity).
Every peer nation funds transit operations federally. The U.S. prohibition on federal operating support — a unique American constraint — forces transit agencies into a permanent funding crisis that produces service cuts, not service improvements.
9.2 million lead service lines remain in the American water system. 94% of Illinois lead lines are in Black and Latinx communities. PFAS contamination has been found in water systems serving hundreds of millions of Americans. Clean water is not a luxury — it is the most basic infrastructure of a functioning society.
42 million Americans lack broadband access. In a knowledge economy, that is not a telecommunications gap — it is an economic exclusion. Chattanooga's public broadband network generates $5.3 billion in economic impact from a public investment. Sixteen states currently ban municipal broadband to protect incumbent ISP profits. Those bans end here.
This pillar reinforces and operationalizes provisions locked in Issues 20, 21, and 23 (tribal broadband).
Germany averages 11.7 minutes of power outage per year. The U.S. averages 118 minutes. The gap is investment, not geography. 2,600 GW of clean energy sits in interconnection queues with a 4–5 year wait. The Texas 2021 freeze killed hundreds of people and cost the economy $130B+ because of grid infrastructure decisions that prioritized cost over resilience.
The U.S. air traffic control system uses technology from the 1960s. American airports are not connected to national rail networks. Freight rail deregulation since 1980 has prioritized shareholder returns over network safety and reliability. Every major European and Asian airport is rail-connected. The U.S. is the outlier.
The problem is not that government cannot build — it is that the government has been stripped of the institutional capacity to do so. The solution is restoring that capacity, not outsourcing it further.
The infrastructure funding architecture combines multiple proven mechanisms — none requiring a single massive tax increase. The gas tax model is dead; the VMT fee is its successor. The National Infrastructure Bank is the missing U.S. equivalent of Germany's KfW. Together they finance $4 trillion over a decade.
Total 10-year target: $4 trillion — closing the $3.7T ASCE gap and bringing U.S. infrastructure spending to approximately 2% of GDP.
The 2024 hurricane season, 2021 Texas freeze, and 2023 Maui wildfires demonstrate that historical climate data is no longer a valid design basis. Every piece of infrastructure built today will operate in a climate significantly different from the one in which it was designed. Building to yesterday's standards is building to fail.
The $4 trillion, 10-year investment is large but achievable. The U.S. currently loses the equivalent in deferred maintenance costs, congestion losses, outage damages, and health costs from lead and PFAS exposure. The funding architecture combines eight streams, each with proven precedent.
The return on investment case: The CBO has consistently found that infrastructure investment pays for itself through long-run GDP growth, productivity gains, and reduced maintenance costs. Every $1 billion invested creates 13,000–25,000 jobs. The Interstate Highway System returned $6 for every $1 invested. The $269B/year in congestion costs, $121B/year in outage costs, and $2,700/household/year in infrastructure-failure costs are the real price of not investing. Bringing spending from 0.51% to 2% of GDP over 10 years closes the ASCE gap and positions the United States to compete in the 21st-century economy.
Infrastructure investment delivers results on a long time horizon. The sequencing prioritizes immediate executive action, followed by foundational legislation, then the major construction phase, and finally full national buildout to world-class standards.
Phase 1 — Immediate
Months 1–6
Phase 2 — Foundation
Years 1–2
Phase 3 — Construction
Years 2–5
Phase 4 — Delivery
Years 5–10
Phase 5 — World Class
Years 10–20
The arguments against infrastructure investment are predictable and have been answered by the evidence repeatedly. Here is that evidence.
"We can't afford $4 trillion."
We can't afford not to invest. Poor infrastructure already costs American households $2,700 per year, businesses $269 billion in congestion annually, and the economy $121 billion in power outage costs — just in 2024. The $3.7 trillion ASCE gap grows larger every year of inaction. The question is not whether we pay — it is whether we pay now through planned investment or later through emergency repairs, productivity loss, and economic decline. The Interstate Highway System returned $6 for every $1 invested in long-run GDP growth. $4 trillion at comparable returns produces $24 trillion in economic benefit. Framing investment as spending and inaction as savings has it exactly backward: deferred maintenance costs multiples of timely investment.
"Government can't build."
The Interstate Highway System was built by the federal government, on budget and on schedule, over 35 years. So was the Hoover Dam. The Tennessee Valley Authority. The Rural Electrification Administration — which brought electricity to rural America when no private company would. The Apollo program. The problem is not that government cannot build. It is that the government has been systematically stripped of the institutional capacity to do so over 40 years: hollowed-out engineering agencies, mandatory consultant dependency, and a procurement system optimized for distributing contracts rather than delivering projects. Pillar 7's Build Smart Act directly addresses this by restoring in-house capacity modeled on Australia, South Korea, and Spain — nations that consistently deliver infrastructure at 20–60% of U.S. costs for comparable projects.
"Privatization is more efficient."
The evidence is unambiguous and consistent. The Chicago parking meter deal: $1.15 billion received for a concession worth $11.6 billion — a $10.45 billion giveaway. British Rail privatization (1994): 30 years of fragmented service, rising fares, declining safety, and a 2024 renationalization at enormous cost. Private water systems charge 59% more than public systems for equivalent service. The theoretical case for privatization efficiency depends on competitive markets; infrastructure is a natural monopoly, not a competitive market. In monopoly conditions, privatization produces rent extraction from a captive public, not efficiency gains. This is not a theory — it is the documented outcome of every major infrastructure privatization in the last 30 years.
"Environmental review slows everything down."
Environmental review is not the problem. The sequential structure with inadequate staffing is the problem. Spain, Japan, and France all conduct thorough environmental review — and build HSR in 4–8 years. The U.S. review takes 4.5 years on average not because there is more to protect, but because reviews happen one after another with chronically underfunded agencies. This platform doubles NEPA staffing, mandates concurrent review (NEPA + ESA + CWA + NHPA simultaneously — the Warp Speed model), and sets hard 2-year deadlines with real enforcement. We speed the process. We do not gut the protections that prevent the next Love Canal, the next Flint, the next community destroyed by a highway routed through it by a government that never asked permission.
The following statistics underpin the policy positions in this document. Each is sourced from engineering organizations, federal agencies, peer-reviewed research, or established investigative reporting.
Issue 25 is the physical infrastructure backbone for much of the Common Good Party platform. The following issues either provide locked provisions this issue builds on, or are directly enabled by the investments proposed here.
| #1 | Healthcare | Clean water (lead and PFAS elimination) has direct public health impact — lead exposure causes irreversible neurological damage; broadband enables telehealth access in rural and underserved communities. |
| #2 | Taxation & Economic Policy | Infrastructure investment as job creation and GDP driver; VMT fee as progressive transportation tax reform; National Infrastructure Bank as public finance institution. |
| #3 | Housing | Federal surplus land for housing along transit corridors; transit-oriented development enabled by HSR and BRT investment; value capture around stations funds both transit and affordable housing. |
| #9 | Defense Spending | Dual-use logistics infrastructure; secure grid hardening as national security investment; port capacity for naval logistics; defense budget reallocation partially funds infrastructure investment. |
| #11 | Climate & Energy Locked | $2.5T grid investment locked in Issue 11's clean energy provisions; carbon fee allocation funds climate resilience; FERC reform; 100% clean grid target requires the HVDC backbone in this pillar. |
| #13 | Labor & Minimum Wage Locked | Davis-Bacon prevailing wage locked on all federally funded infrastructure projects; $20 minimum wage; infrastructure investment as federal jobs program for working-class Americans. |
| #14 | Trade Policy Locked | Buy America 75% domestic content locked; American Industrial Renaissance Act builds the domestic supply chains that make Buy America achievable without cost premium. |
| #20 | Corporate Power & Antitrust Locked | Public broadband preemption locked; $50B broadband fund; anti-privatization provisions preventing Chicago-meter-style giveaways of public infrastructure. |
| #21 | Internet, Privacy & Big Tech Locked | Net neutrality by statute locked; universal broadband as a right; $30/month affordable tier for subsidized ISPs — Issue 25's broadband pillar operationalizes these commitments physically. |
| #22 | Racial Justice | Environmental justice screening on all projects; Reconnecting Communities ($20B) repairs highway damage to Black neighborhoods; Flint Prevention Act; lead pipe replacement prioritizes majority-minority communities. |
| #23 | Indigenous Rights Locked | Tribal water $10B fund locked; tribal broadband at 100/100 Mbps; uranium mine cleanup; climate relocation fund for Alaska Native villages — Issue 25 provides the infrastructure fulfillment of Issue 23's treaty obligations. |
| #24 | Campaign Finance | Political corruption is the direct cause of the frozen gas tax (highway lobby), the Chicago parking meter giveaway (privatization lobby), and the failure to fund transit (auto industry lobby). Issue 24's reforms are what make Issue 25 politically achievable. |
"The richest country on earth should have infrastructure worthy of the 21st century. $4 trillion over 10 years. World-class rail, water, energy, and broadband for every American."— The Common Good Party
Sources & Citations