Section 01

Executive Summary

This is not anti-business. It is anti-extraction.

The fix is structural: redesign the internal dynamics of the corporation so that consistent, sustainable returns serve shareholders, workers, and communities simultaneously. Starting with a 1970 manifesto and accelerated by a 1982 SEC rule, the American corporation was redesigned to funnel wealth upward and treat workers, consumers, and communities as costs to be minimized. The quarterly earnings treadmill has dismantled the social contract: $7.37 trillion in stock buybacks while workers got 26% wage growth against 1,094% CEO pay growth.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau — an agency that returned $21 billion to over 200 million consumers despite being born hobbled by Dodd-Frank restrictions — has been gutted. This platform rebuilds the CFPB in full force as an independent authority with legal authority to keep people honest, and fixes the original restrictions from the start: the auto dealer exemption is repealed, the $10 billion asset threshold eliminated, the FSOC veto abolished, the single-director vulnerability replaced with a five-member bipartisan commission, and the funding cap removed.

The eleven pillars address every dimension: (1) End the Buyback Era — 12% excise tax, 2/3 supermajority; (2) Executive Compensation Reform — 25:1 pay ratio cap for tax deductibility, clawback provisions; (3) Mandatory Long-Term Reporting — 5- and 10-year metrics, stakeholder impact; (4) Product Quality — right to repair, planned obsolescence prohibited; (5) Worker Codetermination — 1/3 board seats for companies 500+, 1/2 for companies 2,000+; (6) Tax Long-Termism — progressive capital gains by holding period; (7) Community Obligation — 12-month closure notice, retraining funds; (8) End Greedflation — FTC price gouging authority; (9) Federal Benefit Corporation Framework; (10) Rebuild the CFPB — independent authority, full enforcement power, fixed from the start; (11) Investor Accountability.

Section 02

The Problem

The incentive structure is perfectly designed to produce exactly the behavior we see — and the behavior we see is extraction.

The Buyback Explosion
Before 1982, stock buybacks were largely prohibited as market manipulation. The SEC's Rule 10b-18 effectively legalized them. S&P 500 companies spent $7.37 trillion on buybacks over the past decade, with a record $942.5 billion in 2024 alone. Apple alone has spent $735 billion buying back its own stock — money that did not go to worker wages, R&D, or community investment. S&P 500 companies distributed 91% of earnings to buybacks and dividends between 2003 and 2012, leaving almost nothing for productive reinvestment.
CEO Pay Disconnect
CEO pay has grown 1,094% since 1978 while worker pay grew just 26%. The CEO-to-worker pay ratio reached 281:1 in 2024, compared to 21:1 in 1965. Executive compensation is now predominantly stock-based — creating a direct financial incentive to prioritize share price over every other measure of corporate health. When buybacks inflate stock prices, executives profit personally. The incentive structure is perfectly designed to produce exactly the behavior we see.
Product Quality Degradation & Greedflation
Products are engineered to fail. Software-dependent devices lose support within three to four years. Warranties are designed to expire just before failure. 33% of grocery items have been shrunk while prices held steady — shrinkflation that transfers value from consumers to shareholders invisibly. Corporate markups grew from 18% above cost in 1980 to 67% in 2016. Profits drove 40–53% of inflation in 2021–23, compared to the historical norm of 11%.
Community Abandonment & CFPB Destruction
The WARN Act requires only 60 days' notice before mass layoffs — inadequate for communities to adapt. Companies that received years of local tax incentives can close facilities and walk away with no obligation to repay. Manufacturing's share of GDP fell from 28% in the 1950s to 9.7% in 2025. Meanwhile, the CFPB — which returned $21B to 200M+ consumers — was gutted: 22+ enforcement cases dropped, $3B+ in consumer harm unaddressed.

The CFPB was born restricted: Auto dealers won an exemption from oversight. Banks under $10B were shielded. The FSOC was given veto power over any CFPB rule. A single-director structure made the agency vulnerable to presidential capture. Despite all these handicaps, the CFPB returned $21 billion to over 200 million consumers and took 350+ enforcement actions. The problem was not just the current attack — it was the original restrictions that made attack possible. We fix both.

Section 03

How We Got Here

A 50-year ideology of extraction built on a single op-ed and one SEC rule change.

1970

The Friedman Doctrine: A Single Op-Ed Rewires Corporate America

Milton Friedman's New York Times manifesto declared that a corporation's sole social responsibility is to increase profits for its shareholders. The Business Roundtable formalized shareholder primacy in 1997. Business schools adopted it as doctrine. Executive compensation was redesigned around it. The legal interpretation of Dodge v. Ford was stretched to require it. A 50-year ideology of extraction was built on a single op-ed.

1982

SEC Rule 10b-18: The Buyback Safe Harbor

When the SEC created Rule 10b-18, it provided a safe harbor from market manipulation charges for companies repurchasing their own stock. The result was the practical legalization of buybacks at scale. Companies quickly discovered that buybacks were the most tax-efficient way to distribute cash to shareholders — and that they had the added benefit of inflating the stock-based compensation of the executives who approved them.

1993

Quarterly Earnings Culture & Stock Option Compensation

The 1993 Clinton-era tax reform capped the deductibility of executive base salary at $1 million but exempted "performance-based" compensation — intended to align executive pay with performance. Instead, it accelerated the shift to stock options and awards, creating massive incentives to maximize short-term stock price. The average stock holding period fell from 8 years in the 1960s to less than 1 year in 2010.

1980–2010

Financialization Over Production

Financial sector profits grew 800% between 1980 and 2005. Manufacturing's share of GDP fell from 28% to under 10%. The economy reoriented from making things to extracting value from financial instruments. Companies that produced goods were acquired, stripped, and financialized. Communities built around production were abandoned. The logic was consistent throughout: maximize returns to capital, externalize all other costs.

2010

CFPB Restrictions From Inception

When Congress passed Dodd-Frank, the financial industry's lobbying produced a series of structural restrictions on the CFPB embedded from day one: the auto dealer exemption, the $10 billion asset threshold, the FSOC veto, and the single-director structure. These were not accidents — they were the price of passage. They also made the agency permanently vulnerable to political capture, as demonstrated in both Trump terms.

Section 04

What Other Countries Do

Every developed economy that outperforms the United States on worker welfare, product quality, and corporate stability has some form of codetermination, long-term investment incentives, or mandatory stakeholder accountability. These are not radical experiments — they are the proven mainstream of developed-world corporate governance.

Country / ModelCorporate GovernanceKey MechanismResult
United StatesShareholder primacy Friedman doctrine; buybacks legalized 1982; quarterly earnings culture SEC Rule 10b-18 safe harbor; stock-based executive comp; no codetermination; CFPB gutted CEO pay 281:1 vs. workers; $942.5B in buybacks (2024); manufacturing 9.7% of GDP
GermanyCodetermination / Mitbestimmung Stakeholder model; workers elect half the supervisory board at companies with 2,000+ employees (Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976) Binding worker representation on boards; co-decision rights on major changes; patient capital culture Zero net job loss in 2009 financial crisis — only G7 country; 14:1 CEO-to-worker pay ratio; strong manufacturing base
Nordic CountriesSweden/Denmark/Finland Strong trade unions; codetermination; active shareholder engagement; high transparency Collective bargaining covers 70–90% of workers; worker board representation; transparent executive pay; long-term institutional ownership Lowest CEO pay ratios in developed world; high worker productivity; strong social contract between corporations and communities
FrancePACTE Law 2019 PACTE reformed corporate purpose; companies can define raison d'être beyond profit Benefit corporation charter; Repairability Index on electronics (1–10 score); shrinkflation disclosure requirements Model for our federal benefit corporation framework (Pillar 9) and Repairability Index (Pillar 4); proven effective at shifting corporate behavior
United KingdomCorporate Governance Code UK Corporate Governance Code; Companies Act 2006 s.172 stakeholder duty Directors must consider workers, communities, environment alongside shareholders; binding say-on-pay for 3 years if under 75% approval Binding say-on-pay model adopted in Pillar 2; stakeholder duty model reinforces mandatory reporting requirements
European UnionCSRD 2024 Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive; mandatory sustainability reporting for large companies Mandatory third-party assured reporting on environmental, labor, and community impacts; double materiality standard; covers 50,000+ companies Model for mandatory stakeholder impact reporting in Pillar 3; CSRD standard adopted and expanded for US context

Germany's codetermination model is the gold standard: demonstrated by its ability to maintain full employment through the 2009 financial crisis without the devastating job losses that struck the United States. France's Repairability Index provides the direct model for Pillar 4. The EU's CSRD provides the direct model for mandatory stakeholder reporting in Pillar 3. These are not ideological experiments — they are proven policy running in the world's most competitive economies.

Section 05

Our Policy — Eleven Pillars

Eleven structural reforms addressing buybacks, executive pay, reporting, product quality, worker power, tax incentives, community obligations, price gouging, corporate structure, consumer financial protection, and investor accountability. Together they redesign the internal dynamics of the corporation.

Pillar 01

End the Buyback Era

Increase the buyback excise tax from 1% to 12% (the ITEP revenue parity rate), phased over three years (4% → 8% → 12%). Before 1982, buybacks were largely prohibited as market manipulation — the bar for approval should reflect that history.

  • Require a 2/3 shareholder supermajority for any buyback program
  • Prohibit executives from selling shares or exercising options within 3 years of a company-initiated buyback
  • Require companies to meet minimum workforce investment and wage growth benchmarks before executing buybacks
  • Treat buybacks as dividends for tax purposes, eliminating their preferential treatment over other forms of worker and community investment
  • Companies receiving federal contracts, subsidies, or bailouts face a complete buyback prohibition for 5 years after receiving public funds
⚖ Revenue: 12% excise tax generates approximately $100B+/year at full rate (ITEP estimate); phased in over 3 years to allow corporate adjustment
Pillar 02

Reform Executive Compensation

Cap corporate tax deductibility of executive compensation at a 25:1 CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio. This does not cap pay — it removes the public subsidy for extreme inequality. If companies want to pay their CEOs 500 times their median worker's salary, they are free to do so — with their own money, not a corporate tax deduction.

  • Executive equity awards must vest over a minimum of 7 years (up from current 3–4 year norms), with clawback provisions if long-term results deteriorate
  • Tie compensation metrics to 5-year rolling performance: revenue growth, workforce stability, customer satisfaction, and product quality — not just stock price
  • Mandatory binding say-on-pay (not advisory) with a 60% approval threshold — failure triggers automatic compensation committee restructuring
  • Ban golden parachutes exceeding 1 year of base salary
  • Require public disclosure of CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio on all public-facing corporate materials
⚖ Revenue: Loss of tax deduction above 25:1 ratio generates approximately $10–20B/year; binding say-on-pay replaces advisory votes that boards have routinely ignored
Pillar 03

Mandate Long-Term Reporting

Companies must discontinue quarterly earnings guidance — shifting analyst focus to annual and multi-year metrics. Annual reports must include 5-year and 10-year performance metrics alongside quarterly results. Mandatory reporting on workforce metrics (median wage, wage growth, turnover, benefits coverage) and product quality metrics (warranty claims, recall frequency, repair rates, customer satisfaction trends).

  • Mandatory stakeholder impact reporting modeled on the EU CSRD — including environmental, labor, and community impacts with third-party assurance
  • All reporting subject to the Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard: SEC enforcement obligated to investigate credible violations within 30 days; inaction defaults to action; 180-day disposition deadline; citizens may sue to compel action
⚖ Enforcement: SEC Duty to Act Standard; 30-day investigation trigger for credible violations; citizen enforcement rights for SEC inaction; third-party assurance required
Pillar 04

Protect Product Quality

Federal Right to Repair Act: products must be designed to be repairable; manufacturers must provide parts, tools, and documentation; planned obsolescence as a design strategy is prohibited. Mandatory Repairability Index on all electronics and appliances modeled on France's proven system — a 1–10 score on packaging and at point of sale.

  • Warranty alignment: minimum 5-year warranty on major appliances; warranty periods must reflect actual expected product lifespan
  • Shrinkflation Disclosure Act: any reduction in product size, quantity, or quality must be prominently disclosed on packaging for 12 months
  • Software support minimums: minimum 5 years of security updates for products over $200; 7 years for products over $500
  • Enforcement: FTC Product Quality Division subject to Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard, with authority to issue mandatory recalls and impose percentage-of-revenue fines
⚖ Enforcement: FTC Duty to Act Standard; percentage-of-revenue fines; mandatory recalls; planned obsolescence prohibition with private right of action
Pillar 05

Strengthen Worker Codetermination

Full German codetermination model: workers elect one-half of board members at companies with 2,000+ employees; workers elect one-third of board members at companies with 500–2,000 employees; mandatory works councils with co-decision rights at companies with 100+ employees. Works councils have binding veto over working hours, overtime, safety, technology changes, and mass layoffs.

  • Workforce investment floor: companies with 500+ employees must invest a minimum of 5% of annual profits in worker training and upskilling
  • Profit-sharing mandate: companies with 1,000+ employees must distribute a minimum of 10% of annual profits to non-executive employees
⚖ Enforcement: Board seat requirements enforced through SEC registration; works council rights enforced through NLRB; profit-sharing mandate with FLSA-style private right of action
Pillar 06

Tax Long-Termism into the System

Progressive capital gains tax by holding period creates massive financial incentives for investors to think like owners, not renters — rewarding patient capital and penalizing speculation that cannibalizes companies for short-term gain.

  • 0–1 year: 40% — short-term speculation taxed as ordinary income; eliminates the advantage of high-frequency trading over long-term investment
  • 1–3 years: 30% — medium-term holdings penalized relative to patient capital
  • 3–5 years: 20% — baseline long-term rate encouraging multi-year ownership
  • 5–10 years: 15% — patient capital reward aligned with long-term corporate health
  • 10+ years: 10% — maximum long-term reward incentivizing investors to hold through economic cycles
⚖ Revenue: Approximately $20–40B/year net; behavioral shift toward longer holding reduces short-term speculation that destroys long-term corporate value
Pillar 07

Corporate Community Obligation

Federal Plant Closing Accountability Act: advance notice increased to 12 months (up from 60 days under the WARN Act) for facilities with 100+ employees; mandatory good-faith transition support including retraining funding, severance minimums, and community economic adjustment grants. When the math changes, communities cannot be abandoned overnight.

  • Local tax base protection: companies receiving local tax incentives that close or significantly downsize within 10 years must repay all incentives plus interest
  • Environmental cost internalization: full-cost remediation bonds required before operations begin; communities are not left with cleanup bills
  • Community impact assessment required before any closure, relocation, or major restructuring
  • Procurement preference: federal contracting gives preference to companies that maintain domestic manufacturing and demonstrate community investment
⚖ Enforcement: 12-month closure notice required; tax incentive clawback with interest; community impact assessment enforceable through injunctive relief
Pillar 08

End Greedflation

Excessive pricing authority: the FTC is empowered to investigate and penalize excessive price increases in concentrated markets (CR4 > 60%) not justified by documented input cost increases. Profits drove 40–53% of inflation in 2021–23, compared to the historical norm of 11%. This is not supply-chain inflation — it is extraction inflation, and it has a remedy.

  • Price-cost transparency: in concentrated industries, companies must publicly disclose the relationship between input costs and consumer prices annually
  • Fines: percentage of annual revenue — minimum 5% of revenue for first offense, 10% for repeat violations — not flat fines that large corporations absorb as a cost of doing business
  • Fine revenue allocation: all greedflation fine revenue directed to education funding and public broadcasting (consistent with Issue 30)
⚖ Enforcement: FTC Duty to Act Standard for concentrated markets; 5–10% of annual revenue fines; fine revenue directed to education and public media
Pillar 09

Federal Benefit Corporation Framework

Create a Federal Public Benefit Corporation (PBC) charter available to any company that commits to stakeholder governance (board includes worker, community, and environmental representatives), transparent profit allocation, a maximum 50:1 CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio, minimum workforce investment standards, and third-party stakeholder impact audits. Voluntary — but creates powerful financial incentives for responsible corporate structure.

  • PBC incentives: FDIC deposit preferences, federal contracting preferences, regulatory fast-tracks, and a lower corporate tax rate (15% vs. 21%)
  • Third-party audit required for certification maintenance; profit allocation published annually
  • Expands on Issue 20's benefit corporation provisions with federal standardization and meaningful tax and procurement incentives
⚖ Revenue cost: Approximately $5–10B/year; offset by reduced safety net expenditures, higher long-term productivity, and reduced externalized community costs
Pillar 10

Rebuild the CFPB — Fixed From the Start

The CFPB was born restricted. Despite being born hobbled, it returned $21 billion to over 200 million consumers, collected $5 billion in civil penalties, processed over 5 million consumer complaints, and took 350+ enforcement actions. We rebuild it in full force — and fix the original Dodd-Frank restrictions from the start.

Fix the original restrictions:

  • Eliminate the auto dealer exemption — Dodd-Frank Section 1029 is repealed entirely; auto lending is one of the largest sources of consumer financial abuse
  • Extend full supervisory authority to ALL financial institutions regardless of asset size — eliminate the $10 billion threshold that shields smaller predatory lenders
  • Abolish the FSOC veto — 12 U.S.C. § 5513 is repealed; no council of bank regulators should have override power over the consumer protection agency
  • Transition to a 5-member bipartisan commission with staggered 7-year terms — removable only for cause; no more than 3 from the same party; no single director who can be fired or captured to gut the agency
  • Eliminate the cap on CFPB funding — the 12% Federal Reserve operating expense cap is removed; the CFPB determines its own budget with a $600M/year statutory floor indexed to inflation

Restore and expand enforcement:

  • Restore all 22+ enforcement actions dropped by the Trump administration — over $3 billion in consumer harm went unaddressed; reopen every dismissed case
  • Expand jurisdiction to cover Big Tech financial products (Apple Pay, Google Pay, Cash App, Zelle, crypto platforms), algorithmic lending, medical debt, corporate junk fees, and BNPL products
  • Percentage-of-revenue fines: minimum 2% of annual revenue for first offense, 5% for repeat violations
  • Anti-sabotage provision: no acting director, OMB official, or executive branch appointee may order the CFPB to cease operations, stop accepting complaints, or dismiss settled enforcement actions without a formal commission vote and 90-day public comment period
  • Settled case protection: once a consent order or settlement is finalized, no subsequent administration may unilaterally vacate it — companies that agreed to pay consumers must pay consumers
  • CFPB subject to Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard: credible complaints investigated within 30 days; 180-day disposition deadline; citizens may sue to compel action
⚖ Enforcement: 5-member commission with staggered for-cause terms; anti-sabotage provision; settled case protection; 2–5% of revenue civil penalties; Universal Duty to Act Standard
Pillar 11

Investor Accountability

Activist investor disclosure: any investor acquiring 3%+ of a company's shares must disclose within 24 hours (down from 10 days) and publicly disclose their intended strategy — preventing covert accumulation that enables destructive short-term activist campaigns before management or workers can respond.

  • Minimum holding period for proxy voting rights: shares must be held for 1 year before the holder gains voting rights — preventing short-term activists from engineering destructive changes and selling before the damage is visible
  • Institutional investor transparency: BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and other large institutional investors must publicly disclose and explain all proxy votes within 48 hours
  • Pension fund fiduciary duty: explicitly includes long-term value — not quarterly returns — as the primary consideration; ban stock lending for short-selling purposes by institutional investors managing retirement funds
⚖ Enforcement: SEC Duty to Act Standard; 24-hour disclosure requirement; automatic stay of voting rights for non-disclosure; ERISA enforcement for pension fund violations
Section 06

How We Pay For It

The corporate responsibility reforms are largely self-financing: the behaviors being taxed and penalized are the same behaviors that currently generate excessive private profit while externalizing costs onto workers, communities, and taxpayers. Redirecting a fraction of that extraction toward public investment is not redistribution — it is recovering costs that were always being borne by the public.

Buyback Excise Tax (12%) ~$100B+/year at full rate
Phased from 1% to 12% over 3 years; S&P 500 buybacks ran $942.5B in 2024. At full rate, generates more than enough to fund the community transition programs in Pillar 7, the CFPB's expanded mandate, and contribute meaningfully to national debt reduction.
Executive Pay Deductibility Cap ~$10–20B/year
Corporations lose the tax deduction for compensation above the 25:1 ratio. Currently deducting billions in executive pay packages from taxable income — a subsidy taxpayers provide for extreme inequality that this platform ends.
Greedflation Fine Revenue ~$5–15B/year (variable)
5% of annual revenue (first offense), 10% (repeat); concentrated industries with unjustified price increases. 100% directed to education funding and public broadcasting, consistent with Issue 30's directive on fine revenue allocation.
CFPB Civil Penalty Revenue ~$5B+/year
Percentage-of-revenue fines (2% first offense, 5% repeat); restored enforcement actions; expanded jurisdiction to Big Tech financial products, algorithmic lending, and medical debt. Whistleblower program funded from penalty revenue (10–30%); remainder to consumer relief fund.
Long-Term Capital Gains Reform ~$20–40B/year net
Higher rates on short-term holdings (40% under 1 year); reduced rates on long-term (10% over 10 years); net revenue positive due to behavioral shift toward longer holding. Combined with Issue 2 tax reform for comprehensive revenue framework.

The buyback excise tax alone generates roughly $100 billion per year at full implementation — more than enough to fund community transition programs, the CFPB's expanded mandate, and contribute meaningfully to national debt reduction (Issue 29). These reforms do not require new taxes on workers or middle-class households — they recover public costs from the entities that created them.

Section 07

Implementation Timeline

Relief for consumers and accountability for the worst corporate actors begins on Day 1 — not after a multi-year legislative process.

Phase 1 — Immediate Enforcement
Day 1 through Month 6
  • Restore all 22+ CFPB enforcement actions; reopen every dismissed case; restore CFPB staffing and complaint intake
  • Issue executive order directing FTC to begin greedflation investigations in most concentrated industries
  • Direct SEC to enforce existing buyback disclosure rules fully
Phase 2 — Legislative Foundation
Months 6–18
  • Pass CFPB Reform Act (Pillar 10 full rebuild): 5-member commission, auto dealer exemption repealed, FSOC veto abolished, $600M funding floor
  • Pass Executive Compensation Reform Act (Pillar 2): 7-year vesting, 25:1 deductibility cap, binding say-on-pay
  • Pass Federal Right to Repair Act (Pillar 4): repairability index, warranty alignment, shrinkflation disclosure
  • Enact buyback excise tax increase to 4% (Phase 1 of Pillar 1)
  • Introduce Worker Codetermination Act (Pillar 5)
Phase 3 — Structural Reform
Months 18–36
  • Codetermination law takes effect (500+ employee threshold); works councils operational
  • Buyback excise tax increases to 8%
  • Long-term capital gains rate reform takes effect (Pillar 6)
  • Federal PBC charter framework enacted (Pillar 9); first PBC certifications issued
  • Mandatory stakeholder reporting phased in for large companies (Pillar 3)
  • CFPB jurisdiction expansion to Big Tech financial products fully effective
Phase 4 — Full Implementation
Months 36–60
  • Buyback excise tax reaches 12% full rate
  • Codetermination extends to 2,000+ employee companies (full board parity)
  • All Pillar 3 reporting requirements fully enforced; corporate transparency normalized
  • Community obligation provisions (12-month closure notice) fully effective
  • CFPB 5-member commission confirmed; all enforcement mechanisms fully operational
Section 08

Addressing Counterarguments

"This is anti-business."
This is anti-extraction — not anti-business. The reforms in this platform are modeled directly on Germany, Japan, and the Nordic countries — economies that consistently outperform the United States on manufacturing quality, worker productivity, and long-term corporate stability. German companies operate under full codetermination, strong unions, and mandatory worker board representation. They are not weaker for it. Volkswagen, Siemens, and BMW compete globally — not despite codetermination, but with it. What is actually anti-business is a system that cannibalizes itself — destroying product quality, community trust, and worker capacity in pursuit of the next quarterly earnings beat.
"Markets should decide executive compensation."
Markets currently cannot decide executive compensation because the people setting it are the same people receiving it. Corporate boards are selected by executives, advised by compensation consultants who are paid to recommend increases, and subject to shareholder votes that are advisory, not binding. This is not a market — it is a cartel. The 25:1 deductibility cap does not prohibit any level of pay. It simply removes the public subsidy: taxpayers will no longer subsidize executive compensation packages above the threshold through the corporate tax deduction. If companies want to pay their CEOs 500 times their median worker's salary, they are free to do so — with their own money.
"This will hurt American competitiveness."
The countries that have implemented these policies — Germany, Japan, the Nordic countries, France — are among the most competitive economies in the world. Germany maintained zero net job loss through the 2009 financial crisis. The Nordic countries have some of the highest living standards and most competitive companies on Earth. The argument that worker rights and corporate accountability destroy competitiveness is not supported by evidence — it is supported by interests. What actually damages long-term competitiveness is under-investing in workers, allowing infrastructure to deteriorate, and cannibalizing companies through buybacks rather than reinvesting in R&D and capacity.
"The CFPB is government overreach."
The CFPB returned $21 billion to over 200 million consumers. Wells Fargo paid $3.7 billion. Credit repair scam victims recovered $1.8 billion. Servicemembers recovered $80 million from illegal overdraft fees. These were not government overreaches — they were corrections of private-sector overreaches against the most vulnerable consumers. The agency that the current administration is gutting was doing exactly what it was designed to do: holding financial institutions accountable for the harm they caused. The argument that consumer protection is overreach is an argument that corporations should be free to deceive and exploit without consequence. Legal authority to keep people honest is not overreach — it is the minimum requirement of a functioning market.
Section 09

Key Statistics

$942.5B / $7.37T S&P 500 buybacks in 2024 (all-time record) / cumulative over the past decade; Apple alone has spent $735 billion buying back its own stock S&P Global
281:1 CEO-to-worker pay ratio in 2024 — was 21:1 in 1965; CEO pay grew 1,094% since 1978 vs. 26% for workers Economic Policy Institute
91% Share of S&P 500 earnings distributed to buybacks and dividends between 2003 and 2012 — leaving 9% for all other investment including R&D, wages, and infrastructure Harvard Business Review
9.7% of GDP Manufacturing share of US GDP in 2025 — down from 28% in the 1950s; financial sector profits grew 800% between 1980 and 2005 as production was displaced by financialization Bureau of Economic Analysis
40–53% Share of 2021–23 inflation attributable to corporate profit growth — compared to the historical norm of 11%; corporate markups grew from 18% above cost in 1980 to 67% in 2016 EPI / Groundwork Collaborative
33% of grocery items Affected by shrinkflation — product size reduced while prices held steady; invisible wealth transfer from consumers to shareholders with no disclosure required under current law Consumer Reports / CNBC
Zero net jobs lost Germany during the 2009 financial crisis — the only G7 country to maintain full employment; direct result of codetermination and works council system this platform adopts OECD
14:1 Germany's CEO-to-worker pay ratio — vs. the US at 281:1; German companies operate under full codetermination and remain globally competitive in manufacturing and engineering EPI / Boeckler Foundation
$21B returned CFPB returned to 200M+ consumers (2011–2025); 350+ enforcement actions; $5B in civil penalties — while operating under original Dodd-Frank restrictions that hobbled the agency from birth CFPB by the Numbers
22+ cases dropped CFPB enforcement actions dismissed by the Trump administration representing $3B+ in unaddressed consumer harm; every case being reopened under this platform National Consumer Law Center
<1 year Average stock holding period in 2010 — down from 8 years in the 1960s; quarterly earnings culture systematically destroys long-term investment incentives that build communities and productive capacity NYSE / World Federation of Exchanges
$100B+/year Estimated annual revenue from the 12% buyback excise tax at full implementation — more than sufficient to fund community transition programs, CFPB expansion, and debt reduction ITEP estimate
Section 10

Cross-References

#2 Taxation
Capital gains holding-period rates (Pillar 6) and CEO compensation deductibility caps (Pillar 2) reinforce tax code reform. Wealth tax and closed loopholes provide the comprehensive framework for ensuring that long-term investors pay less than short-term speculators.
#13 Labor
Codetermination (Pillar 5) = Pillar 4 in Issue 13. Profit-sharing mandate reinforces living wage and union power. Workforce investment floor complements training programs. Worker board seats give labor the institutional voice that collective bargaining alone cannot provide.
#20 Corporate Power
Issue 20 addresses external market structure (monopoly, antitrust, lobbying). Issue 32 addresses internal corporate dynamics (buybacks, CEO pay, product quality, governance). Together they form the complete corporate reform framework — structural and behavioral.
#21 Financial Reform
CFPB rebuild (Pillar 10) directly complements financial system reform. Investor accountability (Pillar 11) reinforces systemic risk reduction by ending the short-termism that amplifies financial instability.
#29 National Debt
Buyback tax revenue (12% excise = ~$100B+/year), greedflation fine revenue, and elimination of excessive CEO compensation deductions generate significant federal revenue contributing to debt reduction without taxing workers or middle-class households.
#30 Media & Press Freedom
Greedflation enforcement fine revenue is directed entirely to education funding and public broadcasting, consistent with the media reform platform directive on fine revenue allocation.
#31 Government Corruption & Democratic Safeguards
The Universal Duty to Act Standard applied to all enforcement bodies (FTC, SEC, CPSC, FDA) mirrors the same standard applied in Issue 31 to every oversight body. Corruption reform and corporate reform are two sides of the same coin — the revolving door between corporate and government power is closed by both issues simultaneously.
"This is not anti-business — it is anti-extraction. Corporations that invest in workers, communities, and long-term value creation are stronger, more resilient, and more profitable. We redesign the incentives so that doing right and doing well are the same thing."
— The Common Good Party
Paid for by The Common Good Party (thecommongoodparty.com) and not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.