Policy Document Series · Issue 20 of 35 · Economy & Markets
Corporate Power
& Antitrust
Anti-Extraction, Not Anti-Business. Competition Requires Rules.

Corporate concentration has reached historic levels across virtually every major US sector. Corporate markups have surged from 18% above cost to 67%. CEO-to-worker pay went from 21:1 to 281:1. Congress members traded $635 million in stocks in 2025. The lobbying industry hit a record $4.4 billion. 866 Hill staffers walked through the revolving door to K Street — also a record. The market is neither free nor competitive when corporations write the rules.

89.9% Google's share of global search — 94.9% on mobile. One federal judge called it: monopolist.
281:1 CEO-to-worker pay ratio in 2024 — was 21:1 in 1965. Corporate markups: 18% → 67%.
$635M In stock trades by members of Congress in 2025. STOCK Act first fine: $200.
$4.4B Federal lobbying record in 2024. 866 staffers to K Street — 60% jump. No consequences.
Contents
Section 01

Executive Summary

This platform is anti-extraction, not anti-business. Competition is the foundation of capitalism. Monopoly is its enemy. When four meatpackers control 85% of beef slaughter, when three PBMs process 80% of all prescriptions, when Google owns 89.9% of global search and a federal judge has called it a monopolist — that is not a free market. That is a captured one. The platform addresses the full architecture of corporate power: market monopoly, government capture, information asymmetry, algorithmic price coordination, labor mobility suppression, governance structure, and infrastructure monopoly.

Eight pillars targeting the full architecture of corporate extraction: Break up monopolies and restore competition. Ban all congressional and executive branch stock trading. End corporate capture of government — 10-year lobbying cooling-off with criminal penalties. Revive the Office of Technology Assessment as an independent Congressional research institute. Federally ban algorithmic price-fixing. Federally ban non-compete agreements. Reform corporate governance with mandatory worker board representation. Build public broadband infrastructure as essential utility.

The Concentration Numbers

Search & Social
89.9%
Google's global search share. Meta owns 4 of top 5 non-Chinese social platforms. Apple and Google duopolize mobile OS at 99.5%.
Healthcare
97%
Of US metro health insurance markets are "highly concentrated." Three PBMs process ~80% of all prescriptions. UnitedHealth owns the insurer, PBM, and provider network simultaneously.
Agriculture & Food
85%
Of US beef slaughter controlled by four meatpackers. Farmer share of retail food dollar: 14.3 cents — lowest ever recorded.
Banking
−72%
Collapse in US bank count since 1984: 14,496 → 4,027. JPMorgan Chase: $3.64 trillion in assets. Five largest banks: 29% of assets (1999) → 45% (2008) → still growing.

Sources: StatCounter · AMA — ama-assn.org · FDIC · NPR — npr.org

Section 02

The Problem

The CEO Pay Explosion

CEO-to-Worker Pay — 1965
21:1
The era of strong unions, antitrust enforcement, and Glass-Steagall. Corporate markups averaged 18% above cost.
CEO-to-Worker Pay — 2024
281:1
After 40 years of weakened enforcement, union decline, and deregulation. Corporate markups now average 67% above cost.

The $4.4 Billion Lobbying Industry

Federal Lobbying Spending by Sector — 2024 Record ($4.4B Total)
Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals
$743.9M
$743.9M
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
$636.4M
$636.4M
Communications & Electronics
$432M
~$432M
Defense & Aerospace
$341M
~$341M
Energy & Natural Resources
$298M
~$298M

Wages, Prices, and the Kill Zone

Corporate markups surged from 18% above cost in 1980 to 67% above cost today. Hospital mergers produce 6–65% price increases with no documented quality improvement. VC investment drops 6× in markets after a major tech acquisition — the "kill zone" effect, where startups stop forming or seeking investment in sectors dominated by potential acquirers. Business dynamism, startup formation, and local journalism have all declined in direct proportion to rising concentration. S&P 500 buybacks hit a record $942.5 billion in 2024 — capital that could have funded wages, R&D, or investment instead returned to shareholders.

Sources: EPI — epi.org · Oxford Internet Institute — oii.ox.ac.uk · S&P Global — spglobal.com

Section 03

How We Got Here

The Revolving Door

866 members of Congress and congressional staffers moved from Capitol Hill to K Street in 2025 — a 60% increase over 2024 and a record. More than 50% of former members who left office in January 2019 became lobbyists or equivalent "strategic advisors." Current cooling-off periods — 2 years for senators, 1 year for House members — are easily circumvented by working as strategic advisors who perform every function of lobbying without the formal title. Current penalty for violations: a $200 civil fine — for positions worth millions in annual compensation.

Congressional Stock Trading

In 2025, 258 members of the 119th Congress made 13,324 trades totaling $635.57 million. On April 2, 2025 ("Liberation Day"), 1,692 trades were recorded in a single day — shortly before the administration reversed tariff policy. An NBER working paper found congressional leaders outperform rank-and-file members by up to 47 percentage points per year after ascending to leadership positions. STOCK Act first-offense fines: $200 per transaction. This is not a disclosure regime. It is a participation pricing schedule.

The OTA Defunding

In 1995, Newt Gingrich's Congress defunded the Office of Technology Assessment — the 143-person nonpartisan agency that had provided peer-reviewed scientific and technical analysis to lawmakers for 23 years, at a cost of $21.9 million annually. Without OTA, Congress must rely on lobbyists for technical knowledge about the very industries they regulate. The statute establishing OTA was never repealed — Congress could revive it with a single appropriation line. The lobbying industry now spends $4.4 billion per year on the same lawmakers who defunded $21.9 million in independent expertise.

Glass-Steagall Repeal

The financial lobby spent $300 million over 20 years lobbying for Glass-Steagall repeal, failing 12 times before succeeding in 1999 with Gramm-Leach-Bliley. The five largest banks went from controlling 29% of banking assets to 45% between 1999 and 2008. TARP disbursed $443.5 billion; the Federal Reserve extended $7.7 trillion in emergency loans. JPMorgan Chase now holds $3.64 trillion in assets. The banks are not back to pre-crisis size — they are bigger than they have ever been.

Sources: LegiStorm — legistorm.com · Common Cause — commoncause.org · American Progress — americanprogress.org · MIT Sloan — mitsloan.mit.edu

Section 04

What Other Countries Do

EU Digital Markets Act

The EU designates "gatekeepers" and prohibits specific anticompetitive practices in advance — self-preferencing, bundled exclusivity, mandatory tying — rather than litigating each individual abuse case by case over years. Google's total confirmed EU antitrust fines exceed €8 billion. Total fines on Google, Meta, and Apple from 2024 through 2026 alone exceed €6 billion. The EU has not suffered innovation stagnation as a result; it has produced an environment where platforms must compete on merit rather than foreclose competition.

German Codetermination

Workers elect one-half of supervisory board members at German firms with 2,000+ employees, and one-third at firms with 500–2,000 employees. Germany's manufacturing productivity, export competitiveness, and wage growth have outperformed the US across multiple dimensions over the same period. Research finds codetermination can increase capital formation — directly contradicting the claim that worker board representation discourages investment. German manufacturers compete successfully in global markets with half their boards elected by workers.

German Non-Compete Model

If a German employer wants to restrict a departing employee from competing, it must pay at least 50% of the employee's prior salary for the full duration of the restriction (capped at 2 years). Without that compensation, the restriction is unenforceable. This makes non-competes a selective tool for genuinely sensitive roles — not the blanket wage suppression instrument used against nurses, hairstylists, and warehouse workers in the US.

Chattanooga Municipal Broadband

EPB's publicly-owned fiber network delivered $2.69 billion in documented economic and social benefits over its first decade against approximately $220 million in costs — a 4.42:1 return. It was the first US city to offer 1 Gbps service (2010) and the first in the world to offer 10 Gbps (2015). It now holds 50%+ local market share against Comcast. Similar results documented in Longmont, CO; Fort Collins, CO; Wilson, NC; and Fairlawn, OH. Private providers declined to build in these markets. Public infrastructure did it instead.

Sources: EU Perspectives — euperspectives.eu · EPI — epi.org · Cities Today — cities-today.com

Section 05

Our Policy — Eight Pillars

Eight pillars targeting the full architecture of corporate power — from market structure through government capture through labor mobility suppression through infrastructure monopoly. The Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard applies to every enforcement body in this platform: credible complaints investigated within 30 days, inaction defaults to action, 180-day disposition deadline, annual public enforcement reports.

Pillar 1 — Flagship Break Up Monopolies & Restore Competition

In August 2024, a federal judge declared Google a monopolist in search. In April 2025, a second ruling found Google illegally monopolized ad tech. Hospital mergers produce 6–65% price increases with no quality improvement. The kill zone effect drops VC investment 6× in markets after major acquisitions. Concentration is not efficient — it is efficient at extracting rents.

  • Reinvigorate FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division with structural remedies — divestitures and breakups — as the default for proven monopolists, not consent decrees and behavioral requirements that expire
  • American Digital Markets Act: designate gatekeepers; prohibit self-preferencing, bundled exclusivity, and mandatory tying in advance — not case-by-case years after the harm
  • Presumption against horizontal mergers in highly concentrated markets; "killer acquisitions" of nascent competitors presumptively blocked
  • Restore Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking — Gramm-Leach-Bliley repeal with 5-year transition; UK ring-fencing as pragmatic template
  • Break up vertically integrated healthcare monopolies — prohibit common ownership of insurers, PBMs, and provider networks simultaneously
  • Agricultural antitrust: break up Big Four meatpackers; cap seed market concentration at 25%; strengthen Packers and Stockyards Act enforcement
  • Cap bank size at 5% of national deposits — JPMorgan Chase at $3.64 trillion is a systemic risk, not a bank
  • Both FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division subject to Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard
Pillar 2 Ban Congressional & Executive Branch Stock Trading

258 members traded $635.57 million in 2025. 1,692 trades on a single day of major tariff policy change. Congressional leaders outperform rank-and-file by up to 47 percentage points after ascending to leadership — a pattern inconsistent with chance. First-offense STOCK Act fine: $200 per transaction. Enforcement: self-policing by the Ethics Committee. The current system is a de facto license for insider trading by lawmakers.

  • Complete ban on individual stock ownership for all members of Congress, senior congressional staff, and senior executive branch officials while in office
  • Mandatory diversified instruments only: mutual funds, index ETFs, US Treasuries — no individual securities, options, or commodity positions
  • Covers spouses and dependent children — the spousal trading exemption is the current system's largest loophole
  • Real penalties: $50,000+ fines per violation, automatic Ethics Committee investigation, full disgorgement of all profits from prohibited trades
  • Extends to the Federal Reserve by statute — not regulation, which can be reversed administratively
  • Independent enforcement body — not congressional self-policing — subject to Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard
Pillar 3 End Corporate Capture of Government

866 Hill staffers moved to K Street in 2025 — a 60% jump. 50%+ of retiring senators become lobbyists at an average 1,452% pay increase. Research shows 3.5 lobbyists advocating for change are needed to overcome one lobbyist defending the status quo — meaning corporate interests have a structural multiplier advantage in every legislative fight.

  • 10-year cooling-off period before former members of Congress or senior staff may engage in any lobbying activity — including as "strategic advisors" performing lobbying-equivalent functions
  • Lifetime lobbying ban for any former official who lobbies on behalf of foreign governments or foreign-controlled entities
  • Ban lobbyist-bundled campaign contributions entirely — the most direct link between lobbying access and campaign money
  • Real-time disclosure of all lobbying meetings and expenditures within 48 hours of contact — not quarterly lag reports
  • Bar registered lobbyists from congressional floor and office suite access
  • Criminal penalties for revolving-door violations — replacing the $200 civil fine regime
  • Combined with Issue 18's publicly funded elections to break the contributions-lobbying feedback loop permanently
Pillar 4 Independent Congressional Research Institute (CINA)

The Office of Technology Assessment was defunded in 1995 at a cost of $21.9 million per year. The lobbying industry now spends $4.4 billion annually — 200× OTA's budget — on the same lawmakers who defunded independent analysis. Without OTA, Congress relies on the industries it regulates for technical expertise on AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, climate science, and pharmaceutical pricing. The OTA statute was never repealed.

  • Revive and massively expand OTA as the Congressional Institute for Nonpartisan Analysis (CINA) — activated through a single appropriation under the existing statute
  • Scope: technology assessment (AI, quantum, biotech), economic analysis (concentration, algorithmic pricing), public health, environmental science, national security
  • Peer review of all published work; public release within 90 days of completion
  • Anti-capture provisions: 5-year revolving-door bars in both directions — no one leaves CINA for industry within 5 years
  • Horizon scanning mandate following the UK Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology model
  • Budget: $200M+/year — still just 1/22nd of the lobbying industry's annual spend
Pillar 5 Ban Algorithmic Price-Fixing

RealPage's algorithmic rent-setting software was used by landlords controlling millions of units. Identical logic applies to healthcare pricing, airline fares, and essential goods. In 2025, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Sherman Act "agreement" requirements may not capture algorithmic coordination — creating a legal gap that this platform closes legislatively.

  • Federal legislation making it unlawful to use or distribute a pricing algorithm that coordinates competitor pricing using shared competitively sensitive data
  • Legislatively override the Ninth Circuit's 2025 ruling — Congress clarifies that algorithmic coordination constitutes an illegal agreement under Sherman Act standards
  • Dual liability for both algorithm developers who sell coordinating software and companies that adopt it
  • Dedicated FTC algorithmic enforcement division with specialized staff — subject to Universal Mandatory Duty to Act Standard
  • Mandatory pricing transparency requirements for housing, healthcare, airline seats, and essential goods where algorithmic coordination is documented
Pillar 6 Ban Non-Compete Agreements

30–60 million workers are currently subject to non-compete agreements. The FTC's projected impact of a federal ban: $488 billion in wage gains over a decade, 8,500+ new businesses annually, 14%+ increase in patenting activity. The nurse, the hair stylist, and the warehouse worker who make up the majority of non-compete subjects have no trade secrets to protect — their non-competes exist solely to suppress wages and mobility.

  • Federal statutory ban on non-compete agreements for all workers — enacted by Congress directly, bypassing FTC rulemaking authority questions
  • Narrow exception for genuine trade secret protection, following the German model: if an employer wants restriction, it must pay at least 50% of prior salary for the duration (capped at 2 years); without compensation, restriction is unenforceable
  • Federal preemption of weaker state laws — national floor at least as protective as California's 150-year non-compete ban
  • Trade secret law already exists independently through the Defend Trade Secrets Act — non-competes add wage suppression, not protection
  • Existing non-competes void immediately upon enactment; no grandfathering of wage suppression contracts
Pillar 7 Reform Corporate Governance

Germany's codetermination model — workers elect half the supervisory board — has been running for decades at firms that are globally competitive manufacturers and exporters. S&P 500 buybacks hit $942.5 billion in 2024. A 4% excise tax on that volume generates approximately $37.7 billion annually. The current 1% rate is not a deterrent — it is a rounding error.

  • Full German codetermination: workers elect one-half of board members at 2,000+ employee companies; one-third at 500–2,000 employees
  • Mandatory works councils with co-decision rights at 100+ employee companies — including veto power over mass layoffs and major restructuring
  • Increase buyback excise tax from 1% to 4%; require 2/3 shareholder supermajority for buyback approval — forcing boards to justify the capital allocation
  • Expand the federal benefit corporation framework — Public Benefit Corporation charter that legally permits consideration of stakeholder interests alongside shareholder returns
  • Executive compensation deduction cap: no corporate tax deduction for executive pay above 50:1 CEO-to-median-worker ratio — does not cap pay, removes the public subsidy for extreme inequality
Pillar 8 Public Broadband & Digital Infrastructure

83.3 million Americans have access to only one broadband provider. Chattanooga's municipal network returned $2.69 billion on a ~$220 million investment — 4.42:1 over a decade. Twenty states have ALEC-drafted laws prohibiting or severely restricting municipal broadband — laws written by the incumbents who failed to serve those communities.

Americans with One Broadband Provider
83.3M
No competition. No alternatives. Prices set by monopoly. Service quality set by monopoly. No market mechanism for improvement.
Chattanooga Municipal Broadband ROI
4.42:1
$2.69B in economic and social benefits vs. ~$220M in costs over the first decade. First US city to offer 1 Gbps. Now 50%+ market share against Comcast.
  • Federal preemption of all state laws banning or restricting municipal broadband — overriding ALEC-drafted restrictions in approximately 20 states
  • $50 billion federal broadband infrastructure fund prioritizing municipal networks, electric cooperative broadband, and non-profit providers — not the incumbents who declined to build
  • Classify broadband as an essential utility with price regulation in monopoly markets
  • Universal minimum standard: 100/100 Mbps symmetrical — the 25/3 Mbps FCC definition is obsolete for modern work, healthcare, and education needs
  • Analogy to rural electrification in the 1930s: private utilities declined to wire rural America; public power cooperatives did it instead
Section 06

How We Pay For It

Most of this platform is enforcement and regulation, not new spending. The two significant expenditures — the Congressional research institute and the broadband fund — are paid for by the savings and revenues the other pillars generate. The real question is the cost of inaction: $4.4 billion in annual lobbying, $942.5 billion in buybacks, $635 million in insider congressional trades, and policy written for donors rather than markets.

PolicyFiscal PositionMechanism / Revenue / Savings
Antitrust enforcementNet revenueAntitrust fines and structural remedies reduce consumer overcharges across concentrated markets
Stock trading banMinimal costAdministrative; eliminates insider trading profits; enforcement commission funded by disgorgement
Lobbying reformMinimal costRegulatory; criminal penalty revenue deters violations; lobbying registration fee funding
CINA Research Institute$200M/year1/22nd of lobbying industry's annual spend; saves far more in better-informed legislation
Algorithmic price-fixing banNet savingsReduces inflated prices in rent, healthcare, and essential goods — savings distributed to consumers
Non-compete banZero direct cost$488B in projected wage gains; 8,500+ new businesses; 14%+ patenting increase
Corporate governance reformNet revenue4% buyback excise on $942.5B = ~$37.7B/year; executive pay deduction cap additional revenue
Broadband fund$50B one-timeChattanooga ROI: 4.42:1; self-sustaining within a decade; funded by 4% buyback excise revenue

Sources: Center for American Progress — americanprogress.org · ILSR — ilsr.org

Section 07

Implementation Timeline

Phase 1 — Year 1
Immediate Enforcement and Legislative Action
Complete ban on congressional and executive branch individual stock trading — effective immediately upon enactment. 10-year lobbying cooling-off period with criminal penalties enacted. Revive OTA as CINA with initial $200M appropriation — single budget line under existing statute. Federal non-compete ban enacted. Federal preemption of state municipal broadband restrictions. Algorithmic price-fixing legislation introduced.
Phase 2 — Years 1–2
Market Structure Reform
American Digital Markets Act enacted — gatekeeper designations, ex ante prohibitions operational. FTC algorithmic enforcement division established and staffed. Federal algorithmic pricing ban enacted. Glass-Steagall restoration begins — 5-year transition period announced. Launch $50B broadband infrastructure fund — first grant rounds to municipal and cooperative applicants. Increase buyback excise tax from 1% to 4%.
Phase 3 — Years 2–4
Structural Remedies and Governance Reform
Antitrust structural remedies for proven monopolists — divestitures and breakups. Healthcare vertical integration breakup proceedings. Agricultural antitrust enforcement — meatpacker concentration remedies. Bank size caps phased in. Codetermination phase-in at 2,000+ employee firms. Works councils at 100+ employees. Executive compensation deduction cap operative.
Phase 4 — Years 4–8
Full Implementation and Monitoring
Complete Glass-Steagall transition. Extend codetermination to 500+ employee firms. Broadband fund fully deployed. Full CINA at operational capacity — peer review cycle established. Universal Mandatory Duty to Act oversight operational across all enforcement bodies. Annual public enforcement reports published. Broadband universal service monitoring in all 50 states.
Section 08

Addressing Counterarguments

"Breaking up companies harms efficiency and innovation."
The concentration era has coincided with declining startup formation, declining business dynamism, and a 6× drop in VC investment in markets where tech giants acquire. Economies of scale are strongest in natural monopolies — electricity, water, sewage — not in digital advertising, search, meatpacking, or health insurance. Europe's stronger enforcement has not produced innovation collapse; the EU is home to globally competitive companies in every sector. Hospital mergers produce 6–65% price increases with no documented quality improvement. Concentration is efficient at extracting rents — it is not efficient at serving consumers or driving innovation.
"Lobbying is constitutionally protected."
Correct — and the Supreme Court has consistently upheld disclosure requirements, cooling-off periods, and restrictions on money flowing through the legislative process. This platform does not ban lobbying — it requires transparency, creates meaningful separation between governmental and lobbying roles, and extends cooling-off periods from 1–2 years to a period that actually prevents immediate revolving-door exploitation. The First Amendment's Petition Clause protects speech and the right to petition government. It does not protect quid pro quo access or the right to convert public service into immediate private profit.
"Non-competes protect trade secrets."
Trade secret law already exists independently and comprehensively — the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 provides civil and criminal remedies for theft of proprietary information. Non-competes add to this only by preventing employees from working for competitors at all — a broader restriction than trade secret protection requires. For the nurse, the hair stylist, and the warehouse worker who make up the majority of non-compete subjects, there is no trade secret involved whatsoever. The German model resolves the legitimate use case: non-competes remain available, but the employer must pay for them at 50% of prior salary. That creates a real cost-benefit calculation instead of blanket wage suppression.
"Municipal broadband is government overreach."
Chattanooga's 4.42:1 return on investment is difficult to argue with on efficiency grounds. Communities in Chattanooga, Longmont, Wilson, and Fairlawn chose municipal broadband through democratic referenda — they were not imposed upon. The real overreach is ALEC-drafted state laws that prohibit communities from building their own infrastructure when private providers decline to serve them at acceptable quality and price. The correct analogy is rural electrification in the 1930s: private utilities concluded rural America was unprofitable and declined to wire it. Rural electric cooperatives and the Rural Electrification Act did it instead. Few people consider rural electrification "government overreach" today.
"Glass-Steagall didn't cause the 2008 crisis."
Fair point, acknowledged directly. The proximate causes of the 2008 crisis were bad mortgage assets, failed risk management, and fraudulent ratings — not Glass-Steagall repeal specifically. The case for restoration is not that repeal caused 2008, but that repeal was part of a broader deregulatory ethos that created institutions too large to fail, with implicit government backstops that distorted risk-taking incentives. JPMorgan Chase at $3.64 trillion in assets is not a bank that can be allowed to fail — it is a financial system that can hold the entire economy hostage in any crisis. The TARP and Fed emergency lending figures are the cost of that implicit guarantee. Ring-fencing or full separation reduces that systemic risk regardless of what specifically caused the last crisis.

Sources: Bipartisan Policy Center — bipartisanpolicy.org · Public Integrity — publicintegrity.org · LA Times — latimes.com

Section 09

Key Statistics

StatisticFigureSource
Google global search share89.9% (94.9% mobile)StatCounter
Big Four airlines: US seat control74%DOT
Metro health insurance markets highly concentrated97%AMA
Big Three PBMs: prescription processing~80%FTC
Big Four meatpackers: beef slaughter85%USDA
US bank count since 198414,496 → 4,027 (−72%)FDIC
CEO-to-worker pay ratio21:1 (1965) → 281:1 (2024)EPI
Corporate markups above cost18% (1980) → 67% (2016)De Loecker et al.
Congressional stock trades (2025)$635.57 million / 13,324 tradesCommon Cause
STOCK Act first-offense fine$200 per transactionSTOCK Act
Federal lobbying record (2024)$4.4 billionOpenSecrets
Hill-to-K-Street revolving door (2025)866 members and staffers — recordLegiStorm
OTA annual cost when defunded$21.9 million/yearAmerican Progress
S&P 500 buybacks record (2024)$942.5 billionS&P Global
Americans with one broadband provider83.3 millionILSR
Chattanooga municipal broadband ROI4.42:1 over first decadeUT Chattanooga
Workers subject to non-competes30–60 millionFTC
Non-compete ban projected wage gains$488 billion over a decadeFTC
Kill zone: VC investment drop post-acquisition6× reductionOxford Internet Institute
Hospital merger price increases6–65% — no quality improvementBipartisan Policy Center
Section 10

Cross-References

Corporate power is not a standalone issue — it shapes healthcare pricing, housing costs, labor markets, the quality of democracy, and the ability to govern. These cross-references reflect the platform's recognition that market concentration and government capture are two faces of the same problem.

Issue 2
Taxation The executive compensation deduction cap (50:1 CEO-to-median ratio) and the 4% buyback excise tax are locked into both Issue 2 and Issue 20 — they appear in both documents because they are simultaneously tax policy and corporate governance policy.
Issue 3
Housing The algorithmic price-fixing prohibition (RealPage model) is addressed in Issue 3 in the housing context and in Issue 20 as an economy-wide federal ban. Pillar 5 here is the general statute; Issue 3 addresses the specific housing application.
Issue 13
Labor & Unions The non-compete ban (Pillar 6) and codetermination (Pillar 7) mirror Issue 13 Pillars 7 and 4 respectively. Anti-monopsony enforcement — preventing employers from colluding to suppress wages — sits at the intersection of antitrust and labor law.
Issue 18
Voting Rights & Democracy Lobbying reform (Pillar 3 here = Issue 18, Pillar 9): the 10-year cooling-off period and criminal penalties are identical provisions in both documents. Publicly funded elections (Issue 18) break the campaign finance half of the lobbying feedback loop that Pillar 3 addresses on the access side.
Issue 21
Internet & Privacy The American Digital Markets Act (Pillar 1) and municipal broadband (Pillar 8) directly intersect with internet governance and privacy frameworks. Platform gatekeeper rules and broadband utility classification are infrastructure-level decisions that shape the privacy landscape.
"This is not anti-business. It is anti-extraction. A free market requires competition, and competition requires rules. When corporations write the rules — through lobbying, through the revolving door, through captured regulators — the market is neither free nor competitive. We restore the rules."
— The Common Good Party
Paid for by The Common Good Party (thecommongoodparty.com) and not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.