Policy Document Series · Issue 8 of 35 · America & the World
China
Competitor, Not Enemy

The Common Good Party rejects the false choice between Cold War confrontation and naive accommodation. Compete where we must, cooperate where we can, and apply the same rules to everyone.

$21.5B Arms backlog undermining Taiwan deterrence
80K+ Manufacturing jobs lost to blanket tariffs
30% Global emissions produced by China
7 Policy domains, six core principles
Contents
Section 01

Executive Summary

China is both competitor and necessary partner. The platform competes on technology, defends Taiwan through deterrence without provocation, uses targeted tariffs only where national security demands it, re-engages on climate, holds China accountable on human rights through multilateral channels, and protects free speech with data localization instead of bans.

01
Competitor, not enemyCompetition and cooperation must coexist — they have to.
02
Protect workers, not corporationsTrade policy that serves American families, not corporate balance sheets.
03
Deterrence through capabilityNot rhetoric. Capability and consistency — not speeches — define resolve.
04
Consistent human rights standardsApplied equally to allies and adversaries. No double standard.
05
Climate cooperation is existentialThere is no solution to climate change without Chinese participation.
06
Industrial policy over tariff wallsBuild American capacity. Don't tax American families.

The policy covers seven domains: Taiwan deterrence, South China Sea freedom of navigation, targeted trade policy, technology competition, climate re-engagement, human rights accountability, and digital sovereignty. Each domain is governed by the same principle that drives Issues 6 and 7: international law applies to everyone.

Section 02

The Problem

US China policy suffers from strategic incoherence — lurching between confrontation and accommodation without a coherent framework for managing the most consequential bilateral relationship of the 21st century.

Taiwan Arms Backlog
A $21.5 billion arms backlog — nearly 70% of Taiwan's defense budget in undelivered weapons — sends exactly the wrong message to Beijing about American resolve.
Blanket Tariff Damage
Trump's tariff war cost 80,000+ American manufacturing jobs, required $12 billion in farmer bailouts, and did not reduce the overall trade deficit — trade simply rerouted through third countries.
Chip Policy Incoherence
The US bans chips, then unbans them, then allows sales at a 25% revenue share. If a chip is a national security risk, don't sell it. Strategic clarity is what makes export controls credible.
Climate Withdrawal
The US joining Iran, Libya, and Yemen outside the Paris Agreement is a national embarrassment — and cedes the moral high ground on the issue where US-China cooperation matters most.
Empty Rhetoric
Human rights statements without Magnitsky sanctions, import bans, and multilateral coordination are empty. Consistency requires applying the same standards to China that the platform applies to Russia and Israel.
TikTok Free Speech
Banning a platform used by 170 million Americans would be the largest government censorship action in US history. The solution is data regulation, not prohibition.

Sources: Taiwan News — Arms Backlog · Peterson Institute — Trump Tariffs · Earth.org — Paris Agreement Exit

Section 03

How We Got Here

The US-China relationship has deteriorated through a combination of genuine strategic divergence and policy incoherence. China's military modernization, territorial assertiveness, technological ambitions, and human rights abuses in Xinjiang represent real challenges that demand serious responses. But the American response has been inconsistent — combining rhetorical escalation with strategic confusion. Understanding how we arrived here requires tracing five decades of engagement, competition, and miscalculation.

1972
Nixon Opening
President Nixon's visit to Beijing and the Shanghai Communiqué established the framework for US-China engagement, acknowledging "one China" while preserving ambiguity on Taiwan's status. The strategic logic: drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Office of the Historian, US Department of State).
1979
Normalization & the Taiwan Relations Act
The Carter administration formally recognized the People's Republic of China and severed official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), committing the US to provide Taiwan with defensive arms and to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force that would jeopardize Taiwan's security — the legal foundation for the current arms relationship (Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8).
1989
Tiananmen Square Massacre
The Chinese government's violent suppression of pro-democracy protesters killed hundreds to thousands of civilians. The US imposed sanctions including arms embargoes, suspended military exchanges, and froze bilateral relations — but within two years, economic engagement resumed. The pattern of condemning human rights abuses while prioritizing economic ties was established (Amnesty International, 1989 annual report).
2001
China WTO Accession
China joined the World Trade Organization after years of negotiation, gaining Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status that Congress granted in 2000. The bipartisan consensus held that trade integration would liberalize China politically. It did not. China's share of world manufacturing exports surged from 5% to 15% within a decade, triggering the China Shock that destroyed 2.0-2.4 million American jobs (Autor, Dorn & Hanson, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2016).
2013
Belt and Road Initiative Launched
Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), committing over $1 trillion in infrastructure investments across 140+ countries. BRI represented China's most ambitious projection of economic influence since the Communist revolution — building ports, railways, and telecommunications networks that created dependency relationships with developing nations (World Bank, Belt and Road Economics, 2019).
2018–2020
Trade War — Blanket Tariffs
The Trump administration imposed Section 301 tariffs on approximately $370 billion in Chinese goods at rates of 7.5-25%, eventually covering roughly two-thirds of US imports from China. China retaliated with tariffs on $110 billion in US goods, devastating agricultural exports. The result: 80,000+ American manufacturing jobs lost, $12 billion in emergency farmer bailouts, and no reduction in the overall trade deficit — imports simply rerouted through Vietnam, Mexico, and other third countries (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2020; Federal Reserve Board, 2019).
2022
CHIPS and Science Act & Pelosi Taiwan Visit
Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, authorizing $52 billion for domestic semiconductor manufacturing and $200+ billion for scientific research. In August, Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan triggered China's largest-ever military exercises around the island, including missile launches over Taiwan for the first time. The juxtaposition crystallized the dual-track challenge: competing on technology while managing escalation risk (CHIPS.gov; DOD, August 2022 Taiwan Strait assessment).
2023
Surveillance Balloon Incident
A Chinese surveillance balloon traversed US airspace before being shot down off South Carolina, leading Secretary Blinken to postpone a planned Beijing visit. The incident exposed the fragility of diplomatic channels and the absence of reliable crisis communication mechanisms — problems exacerbated by China's suspension of military-to-military contacts after the Pelosi visit (DOD, February 2023 briefing).
2025–2026
Escalation and Incoherence
The H200 chip policy — banning a chip, unbanning it, then allowing sales at a 25% revenue share — epitomized strategic incoherence. The January 2026 CMC purge disrupted military-to-military channels at a critical moment. The $21.5 billion Taiwan arms backlog grew while Paris Agreement withdrawal ceded moral authority on climate. The result: a policy simultaneously too confrontational to sustain cooperation and too inconsistent to sustain deterrence (ICDS, 2026; CFR/Semiconductors Insight, 2026).

Taiwan deterrence was actively undermined. The US combined record arms sales with the softest Taiwan language in decades, while allowing a $21.5 billion delivery backlog to erode the credibility of American resolve. Military-to-military communication channels were further disrupted by the January 2026 CMC purge, reducing crisis management capacity at precisely the wrong moment.

The H200 chip policy was a case study in incoherence. Banning a chip, unbanning it, then allowing it at a 25% revenue share exemplified the strategic confusion that destroys allied confidence in coordinated action. Export controls that flip-flop are worse than no controls at all — they signal that US policy is negotiable.

Withdrawal from Paris ceded the climate agenda to Beijing. On trade, blanket tariffs imposed billions in costs on American consumers while trade simply rerouted through third countries. The result: a policy simultaneously too confrontational to allow cooperation and too incoherent to sustain deterrence.

Sources: Office of the Historian — Nixon Opening · Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) · Autor, Dorn & Hanson (2013) · World Bank — Belt and Road Economics · Peterson Institute — Trump Tariffs · CHIPS.gov · ICDS — US-China Dialogue · CFR/Semiconductors Insight — H200 Policy

Section 04

What Other Countries Do

Allied approaches to China share common elements: maintain economic engagement while building security hedges, coordinate on technology controls, and invest in regional deterrence. No major US ally has adopted a full decoupling posture. Each has developed a distinct, coherent strategy — something the US has failed to do.

Country / Alliance Approach Key Actions
Japan Economic Security Act + alliance deepening ESPA framework, JJOC transformation, counterstrike capability, Chip 4 participation. Taiwan treated as near-existential.
Australia AUKUS + selective engagement Nuclear submarine deal, Pillar II tech cooperation, restored trade dialogue with Beijing.
European Union De-risking, not decoupling Critical Raw Materials Act, foreign subsidies regulation, anti-coercion instrument. Trade continues.
Chip 4 Alliance Coordinated export controls US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan control 82% of global semiconductor market. Unified restrictions.
ASEAN Hedging Code of Conduct negotiations ~70% complete (2026 target). Balancing economic ties with security concerns.
Quad (US-Japan-India-Australia) Functional cooperation framework Maritime domain awareness, critical minerals, disaster response, tech standards. Not a military alliance — respects India's strategic autonomy.

European Union: De-Risking, Not Decoupling

The EU's 2023 European Economic Security Strategy explicitly rejected decoupling from China in favor of "de-risking" — reducing critical dependencies without severing trade ties. The approach combines three instruments:

Japan: Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA)

Japan's 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act represents the most comprehensive allied framework for managing China competition. ESPA integrates four pillars under one legal architecture:

Japan has simultaneously deepened military integration through the Joint-Joint Operations Command (JJOC) transformation, developing counterstrike capabilities and treating Taiwan's security as near-existential — Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy explicitly named China as "the greatest strategic challenge" (Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, December 2022).

Australia: AUKUS and the China Reset

Australia's approach demonstrates that security hardening and diplomatic engagement are not mutually exclusive:

Quad Framework (US-Japan-India-Australia)

The Quad operates as a functional cooperation framework, not a military alliance — a distinction critical to maintaining India's participation given its strategic autonomy posture:

The Chip 4 alliance is the model. Controlling 82% of the global semiconductor market, coordinated export controls through Chip 4 (US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) represent the most effective form of allied coordination. Japan and the Netherlands agreed in January 2023 to restrict exports of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, aligning with US controls. The goal is to replicate this multilateral framework across all critical technology domains — not act unilaterally and then reverse course (US-Japan-Netherlands Semiconductor Agreement, January 2023; Indo-Pacific Studies Center, Chip 4 Alliance Analysis).

Sources: European Commission — Economic Security Strategy · Cabinet Office of Japan — ESPA · Australian Defence Strategic Review · Quad Leaders' Joint Statement · East Asia Forum — South China Sea · Indo-Pacific Studies — Chip 4 Alliance · Lowy Institute — Australia-China Relations

Section 05

Our Policy

The Common Good Party's China policy operates across seven domains, governed by the six core principles above. Each domain has specific, enforceable commitments — not aspirational rhetoric.

Domain 1 Taiwan — Deterrence Without Provocation
  • Clear the $21.5 billion arms backlog. Fix the US defense industrial base to meet delivery commitments. Undelivered weapons are not deterrence.
  • Support asymmetric defense. Fund the porcupine strategy — mobile anti-ship missiles, drones, mines, man-portable systems. The CNAS "Hellscape" concept draws from Ukraine's lessons.
  • Strengthen the alliance network. Fully support AUKUS, US-Japan JJOC transformation, Typhon deployments in the Philippines, Quad coordination, and Chip 4 semiconductor cooperation.
  • Maintain military-to-military communication. Deterrence works best when both sides understand red lines. Rebuild the crisis channels disrupted by the January 2026 CMC purge.
  • Never negotiate Taiwan's status with Beijing. Taiwan's people determine Taiwan's future. No grand bargain that trades sovereignty for trade deals.
Domain 2 South China Sea
  • Honor the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Attacks on Philippine vessels trigger treaty obligations — non-negotiable.
  • Continue Freedom of Navigation Operations. Assert the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling: China's nine-dash line has no legal basis under international law.
  • Invest in EDCA sites. The nine Philippine sites need integrated air and missile defense, adequate force presence, and clear basing policies.
Domain 3 Trade — Targeted Tariffs Only
  • Reject blanket tariffs. The 2018-2020 tariffs applied rates of 7.5-25% across ~$370B in Chinese imports covering roughly two-thirds of all US imports from China. Result: 80,000+ manufacturing jobs lost, $12B in farmer bailouts, and no reduction in the overall trade deficit — imports rerouted through Vietnam (+36%), Mexico (+25%), and other third countries (Peterson Institute, 2020; Federal Reserve Board, 2019). Blanket tariffs are regressive taxation, not trade strategy.
  • Maintain targeted tariffs on national security sectors at the following rates:
    • Semiconductors and advanced chips: 25% tariff maintained — paired with full CHIPS Act funding. China's $150B+ semiconductor subsidies constitute unfair competition; the tariff buys time for domestic capacity to scale (USITC, Semiconductor Tariff Review, 2024).
    • Rare earths and critical minerals: 25% tariff plus strategic reserve requirements. China controls ~60% of mining and ~90% of processing; tariffs fund diversification while reserves buffer against export weaponization (DOE Critical Minerals Strategy, 2023).
    • Defense-adjacent steel and aluminum: 25% tariff on steel, 10% on aluminum — maintained only for defense-grade specifications. Commercial-grade steel and aluminum tariffs eliminated to reduce costs for downstream manufacturers that lost ~75,000 jobs under blanket steel tariffs (Federal Reserve, 2019).
    • AI hardware with military applications: 50% tariff plus export control alignment with Chip 4 allies. GPU clusters capable of training frontier AI models restricted under coordinated multilateral controls (Bureau of Industry and Security, October 2023 Advanced Computing Rule).
    • Pharmaceutical active ingredients (APIs): 15% tariff ramping to 25% over 3 years, paired with domestic API manufacturing investment. China supplies ~40% of US generic drug APIs; this is a national security vulnerability exposed during COVID (FDA Drug Shortage Reports, 2024).
  • Remove tariffs on consumer goods — clothing, general electronics, household items — that function as taxes on American families. The 2025 "Liberation Day" tariffs raised apparel prices 17% and cost the average household $1,800/year, with the bottom income decile bearing 2.5x the burden of the top decile (Yale Budget Lab, 2025).
  • Phase down clean energy tariffs with snap-back provisions. The current 100% tariff on Chinese EVs and 50% on solar panels slow the American clean energy transition. Reduce to 25% over 3 years as domestic manufacturing scales — with automatic snap-back to original rates if domestic capacity targets are not met. Every tariff must have a domestic production milestone or it is just a tax (IRA clean energy investment tracker, 2025).
  • 5-year sunset clause on every tariff with mandatory review: Did domestic capacity actually grow? Did the tariff serve its stated purpose? If not, it is eliminated. If yes, it phases down as domestic capacity comes online.
  • Address trade rerouting through rules-of-origin enforcement, not more blanket tariffs. Section 301 tariffs achieved near-zero manufacturing job growth because imports simply shifted to Vietnam and Mexico with minimal value-added processing — the goods were still Chinese (Federal Reserve, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs, 2020).
Domain 4 Technology Competition
  • Fully fund CHIPS and Science Act. Domestic semiconductor manufacturing, AI research, clean energy, quantum computing — don't cede 21st-century industries.
  • Coordinate export controls with allies. The US-Japan-Netherlands semiconductor framework and Chip 4 alliance must be tightened and unified.
  • End the revenue-share giveaway. If a chip is a national security risk, don't sell it. No more banning chips then allowing sales at a percentage share.
  • Build an Economic Security Act modeled on Japan's ESPA — integrating supply chain resilience, infrastructure protection, technology development, and investment screening.
  • Diversify rare earth supply chains. China controls ~60% of global production. Fund domestic mining, allied diversification, strategic reserves, and recycling research.
Domain 5 Climate — Re-Engage Immediately
  • Rejoin the Paris Agreement. Day one. Non-negotiable.
  • Re-enter the UNFCCC. Full participation in the international climate framework.
  • Restore US-China bilateral climate cooperation. Rebuild the Sunnylands framework. Push for binding methane commitments. Joint research on carbon capture, nuclear fusion, and next-generation batteries.
  • Compete on clean energy, don't wall it off. Invest massively in American solar, wind, EV, and battery manufacturing. Reduce tariffs on clean energy imports where no domestic alternative exists at scale.
  • Hold China accountable on coal through multilateral pressure — not unilateral tariffs. China adding ~100 GW of new coal capacity while leading in solar exports is a contradiction that demands collective action.
Domain 6 Human Rights — Consistent Standards
  • Enforce the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. Rigorous enforcement of import bans on goods produced with forced labor in Xinjiang.
  • Expand Global Magnitsky sanctions targeting officials and companies directly responsible for abuses in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet.
  • Re-designate China as a Country of Particular Concern per USCIRF 2026 recommendation.
  • Act through multilateral channels. Coordinated action raises costs while reducing China's ability to single out one country for retaliation.
  • Protect diaspora communities from Chinese transnational repression targeting Uyghur, Tibetan, and Hong Kong communities in the US.
Domain 7 Digital Sovereignty
  • No bans. Banning TikTok would be the largest government censorship action in US history. Free speech means free speech — regulate data practices, not platforms.
  • Require data localization. US user data stored on US servers, subject to US privacy law. The Oracle joint venture framework is a reasonable model.
  • Independent security audits. Regular third-party review of data handling, algorithm behavior, and foreign access.
  • Apply the standard universally. If data localization applies to Chinese-origin apps, hold all major platforms — American included — to equivalent privacy standards.

Sources: CNAS — Hellscape Strategy · UHRP Sanctions Tracker · USCIRF 2026 Report · Reuters — TikTok Oracle Deal

Section 06

How We Pay For It

Industrial policy is an investment, not a cost. The CHIPS Act funds domestic semiconductor manufacturing that generates returns in jobs, tax revenue, and supply chain security. Removing blanket tariffs reduces costs for American consumers while maintaining targeted tariffs on genuine national security sectors. Below is the full cost and offset picture.

Investment Costs

Component Estimated Cost Details
CHIPS Act full implementation ~$52B (authorized) Already authorized by Congress (P.L. 117-167). Requires full appropriation. As of 2025, the Commerce Department has awarded $36B in preliminary grants; $16B in commitments remain. Each $1 in CHIPS funding has catalyzed $4-6 in private semiconductor investment — $600B+ total (CHIPS.gov, 2025).
CHIPS Act follow-on: next-generation semiconductor R&D ~$20B over 5 years The original CHIPS Act addressed current-generation fabrication. Next-generation nodes (2nm and below), advanced packaging, and compound semiconductors require sustained investment beyond initial authorization. The National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) needs full funding to maintain US competitiveness against China's $150B+ semiconductor subsidies (SIA, State of the US Semiconductor Industry, 2024).
AUKUS implementation costs (US share) ~$4.6B over 10 years US costs include: expanding Virginia-class submarine production from 1.2 to 2.0 boats/year ($2-3B in shipyard infrastructure), maintaining 3 Virginia-class boats at HMAS Stirling for Australian crew training, and Pillar II technology cooperation programs (Congressional Budget Office, AUKUS Cost Assessment, 2023; Congressional Research Service, April 2024).
Taiwan defense aid and arms backlog clearance ~$2B/year for 5 years The $21.5B backlog includes F-16V fighters, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, HIMARS, M1A2T Abrams tanks, and Stinger missiles. Clearance requires defense industrial base expansion — additional production lines, workforce training, and supply chain investment. The FY2024 NDAA authorized $2B/year in Taiwan security assistance; full funding has not been appropriated (Taiwan News; DoD Comptroller, FY2025 Budget).
Diplomatic corps expansion for Indo-Pacific ~$500M/year State Department Indo-Pacific staffing is 15-20% below authorized levels. Expansion includes: 200+ new diplomatic positions across ASEAN embassies, Mandarin/regional language training pipeline, enhanced economic officer corps for supply chain diplomacy, and expanded public diplomacy to counter BRI influence. Currently the US has fewer diplomats in all of ASEAN than China has in a single Southeast Asian country (CSIS, Revitalizing the State Department, 2023).
Rare earth diversification ~$5–10B over 10 years China controls ~60% of global rare earth mining and ~90% of processing. The Quad Critical Minerals Initiative and DPA Title III investments fund: domestic mining permits and processing facilities (MP Materials in California, Ucore in Alaska), allied diversification in Australia and Canada, strategic reserve expansion, and recycling R&D (DOE Critical Minerals Strategy, 2023).
EDCA site investment ~$2–5B The nine Philippine EDCA sites need: integrated air and missile defense systems, runway extensions for combat aircraft, fuel and munitions storage, barracks, and communications infrastructure. Current investment of ~$100M/year is inadequate for credible force projection (FULCRUM/ISEAS, 2026).
Clean energy industrial policy Funded via Issue 2 Taxation revenue from wealth and corporate reforms. Solar, wind, EV, and battery manufacturing investment.

How It Is Paid For: Revenue Sources and Offsets

Revenue / Offset Annual Estimate Details
Targeted national security tariffs (maintained) $30–40B/year Tariffs on semiconductors, rare earths, critical minerals, defense-adjacent tech, and AI hardware are retained. These generated approximately $30-40B annually under Section 301, even after removing consumer goods tariffs. Revenue is dedicated to industrial policy and worker transition — not general revenue (USITC, Section 301 Tariff Revenue Data, 2024).
Blanket tariff elimination — consumer savings $60–80B/year offset Removing tariffs on consumer goods (clothing, electronics, household items) saves American households ~$1,200-1,800/year and eliminates the regressive consumption tax. This is not revenue — it is a cost reduction that frees household spending and reduces inflationary pressure (Yale Budget Lab, Liberation Day Tariff Analysis, 2025).
Supply chain resilience savings $15–30B/year (long-term) The COVID-19 pandemic exposed supply chain vulnerabilities that cost the US economy an estimated $240B in 2020-2021 through shortages, price spikes, and production shutdowns. Domestic semiconductor fabrication, pharmaceutical API production, and rare earth processing reduce these shock costs by 30-50% within 10 years (White House Supply Chain Report, June 2021; McKinsey Global Institute, 2022).
CHIPS Act private investment catalysis $100B+/year (private sector) The $52B CHIPS Act has already catalyzed $600B+ in announced private semiconductor investments (TSMC Arizona, Samsung Texas, Intel Ohio, Micron New York). Tax revenue from these facilities, employment, and supply chain activity generates substantial federal and state revenue — estimated at $15-25B/year when fully operational (CHIPS.gov; SIA investment tracker, 2025).
Defense spending reallocation (not new money) Within existing DOD budget AUKUS costs, EDCA investment, and arms backlog clearance are funded within the existing $886B defense budget through reallocation from lower-priority programs — not new spending. The CGP defense paper (Issue 9) requires a Pentagon audit and identifies $50-100B in waste, fraud, and cost overruns available for redirection (GAO, DOD Financial Management, 2024).

Net fiscal picture: The total new investment cost is approximately $80-90B/year at peak (CHIPS follow-on, rare earths, diplomatic expansion, Taiwan aid). This is funded by: targeted tariff revenue ($30-40B/year), CHIPS Act-catalyzed tax revenue ($15-25B/year), defense reallocation (budget-neutral), and Issue 2 taxation revenue for clean energy industrial policy. The consumer savings from eliminating blanket tariffs ($60-80B/year returned to households) represent a significant net economic benefit even before accounting for supply chain resilience gains and private investment catalysis.

Section 07

Implementation Timeline

Phase 1 — Day 1 to Month 6
Immediate Action
Rejoin Paris Agreement. Re-enter UNFCCC. Begin arms backlog clearance. Restore military-to-military channels. Announce tariff review. Enforce Uyghur Forced Labor Act.
Phase 2 — Month 6 to Year 1
Legislative and Diplomatic
Remove blanket consumer tariffs. Full CHIPS Act funding. Data localization framework enacted. Rebuild Sunnylands climate cooperation. Expand Magnitsky sanctions.
Phase 3 — Year 1 to Year 3
Structural Reform
Economic Security Act introduced. Chip 4 export controls unified. EDCA sites operational. Rare earth diversification underway. ASEAN Code of Conduct supported.
Phase 4 — Year 3 to Year 5
Strategic Consolidation
Domestic semiconductor capacity operational. Clean energy manufacturing competitive. Taiwan deterrence strengthened. Alliance network fully integrated.
Section 08

Addressing Counterarguments

"China is an enemy, not a competitor."
China is the world's second-largest economy, the largest trading partner of most US allies, and essential to solving climate change. Treating China as an existential enemy guarantees confrontation without securing cooperation on issues where American interests require it. Competition and cooperation can coexist — they must.
"Tariffs protect American workers."
Blanket tariffs cost 80,000+ manufacturing jobs and required $12 billion in farmer bailouts. They are a regressive consumption tax that hits working families hardest. Targeted tariffs on national security sectors protect strategic interests. Industrial policy — investing in American capacity — protects workers. Blanket tariffs do not.
"We should ban TikTok."
Banning a platform used by 170 million Americans is the largest government censorship action imaginable. The solution is data localization, security audits, and universal privacy standards — applied to all platforms, not just Chinese-origin ones. Free speech means free speech.
"Climate cooperation legitimizes China."
China produces 30% of global emissions. There is no solution to climate change without Chinese participation. Refusing to cooperate on climate to avoid "legitimizing" China is choosing to lose the climate fight to win a symbolic point. The planet does not care about political posturing.
"Taiwan can defend itself."
Not with a $21.5 billion backlog of undelivered American weapons. Taiwan's defense depends on US commitment — and that commitment is measured in delivered capability, not speeches. The porcupine strategy works only if the weapons actually arrive.
Section 09

Cross-References

This policy is integrated with the broader platform. The consistency principle — the same rules for everyone — links China policy to other foreign and domestic issues.

Issue 2
TaxationRevenue for industrial policy — CHIPS Act, clean energy manufacturing, and rare earth diversification funded through wealth and corporate tax reform.
Issue 6
Israel & GazaConsistent international law standards. If the US holds Israel accountable for humanitarian violations, it must hold China accountable for Xinjiang.
Issue 7
Ukraine & NATOTaiwan is watching Ukraine. A successful Russian territorial conquest emboldens Beijing. The territorial integrity principle applies universally.
Issue 9
Defense SpendingIndo-Pacific deterrence investment, arms backlog clearance, and defense industrial base reform. Pentagon audit requirement applies.
Issue 11
Climate & EnergyUS-China climate cooperation is essential. Rejoin Paris Agreement. Compete on clean energy manufacturing — don't wall it off.
Issue 14
TradeTargeted vs. blanket tariffs. Rules-of-origin enforcement. Industrial policy as the alternative to tariff walls.
Issue 21
Internet & PrivacyUniversal data localization and privacy standards apply to all platforms — TikTok, Meta, Google. Not a China-specific standard.

The consistency table below shows how the same principles apply across all three major foreign policy issues:

Principle Issue 6 — Israel & Gaza Issue 7 — Ukraine & NATO Issue 8 — China
International law for all Conditional aid tied to IHL compliance Sovereignty inviolable Xinjiang accountability via multilateral channels
No territorial seizure Two-state on 1967 lines Including Crimea Taiwan's people determine Taiwan's future
Multilateral over unilateral ICC/ICJ cooperation NATO/EU solidarity Quad, AUKUS, Chip 4
Defend without provoking Honest broker posture Full support, no escalation Deterrence through capability, not rhetoric
Human dignity Palestinian rights Ukrainian sovereignty Uyghur, Tibetan, and Hong Kong rights
"China is both competitor and necessary partner. The false choice between Cold War confrontation and naive accommodation serves neither American interests nor global stability. Compete where we must, cooperate where we can, and apply the same rules to everyone."
— The Common Good Party
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